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ABSTRACT
Availability, together with confidentiality and integrity, form the basic con-
cepts of information security. Indeed, a device, protocol, or network can
enjoy the highest level of confidentiality and integrity, but still be of very
little value to its clients if it is not available. In this dissertation, I consider
the availability of wireless networks, which have permeated into almost every
aspect of our daily life, from entertainment such as online games to utility in-
frastructure such as smart grids. A faulty entity can disrupt the connectivity
offered by the lower layers of a wireless network and interrupt the provided
services; thus, network availability in the lower layers is essential both to
prevent inconveniences and to reliably provide critical services.
This dissertation considers three major philosophies that aim to provide
availability by defending against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks at the lower
layers. Specifically, a network can
1. detect misbehaviors to eliminate DoS attacks;
2. enforce fairness to mitigate DoS attacks; or
3. adopt randomization to escape DoS attacks.
For each philosophy, this dissertation presents a case study. I present a
location verification protocol at the physical (PHY) layer that detects mis-
behavior in order to provide reliable position-based services. I also present
a transport layer protocol that mitigates the flooding attack by enforcing
Transport Control Protocal (TCP) fairness. I then present a flooding pro-
tocol that uses randomness at the PHY layer to escape from the jamming
attack.
ii
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, whose support, encouragement,
and love made this work possible.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I remember reading once, “I thank the Lord, for there are too many people
to whom I owe my gratitude.” By no means can I write down a complete
list of people I would like to thank, nor can I truly express my wholehearted
gratitude to those I do list here.
I would like to thank the Lord, who gave me strength, so that I may finish
what I started.
I would like to thank my parents, to whom I dedicate my dissertation.
Their unconditional love and encouragement were both the motivation and
the inspiration behind my work. I would like to thank Elaine, who has spent
much time with me, and has given me laughter and joy over the past several
years.
I would like to thank my adviser, Dr. Yih-Chun Hu, whose guidance helped
me grew as a researcher. Over the past six years, Dr. Hu has been far more
than just an adviser; he has been both a mentor and a friend, whose support
I rely on – from tangible items such as conference travel to intangible items
such as research philosophies.
I would like to thank all my friends for the many fruitful discussions over
the years. Jason has helped me countless times, not only in technical fields
but also in spiritual growth, and I would like to thank him greatly. Bernard
has always been a good friend, who also encouraged me to finally graduate.
Dongho and Jihyuk have provided me with many lively research discussions;
their experimental implementations were included in this dissertation as well.
I would like to thank the rest of my lab and my fellowship, who have always
been there for me in times of need.
Finally, I would like to thank my committee for all the feedback and sug-
gestions they have provided to make this a better dissertation.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Availability in the Lower Layers of a Wireless Network . . . . 1
1.2 Eliminating Denial-of-Service by Detecting Misbehaviors . . . 3
1.3 Mitigating Denial-of-Service by Enforcing Fairness . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Escaping Denial-of-Service by Adopting Randomization . . . . 4
CHAPTER 2 LOCATION VERIFICATION: AN ESSENTIAL STEP
IN SECURELY PROVIDING LOCATION-BASED SERVICES . . 5
2.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Attacker Model and System Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Simultaneous Multilateration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Optimality of Simultaneous Multilateration . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Collusion Attack against Simultaneous Multilateration . . . . 18
2.6 Mitigating the Distance Enlargement Attack . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Security Analysis of the Optimized Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.9 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
CHAPTER 3 PARTIAL DEAFNESS: A MAC LAYER ATTACK
THAT EXPLOITS DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS . . . . 33
3.1 Overview of IEEE 802.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 The Partial Deafness Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Implementation and Evaluation of the Attack . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Countermeasure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
CHAPTER 4 CRAFT: A SECURE TRANSPORT LAYER CON-
GESTION CONTROL PROTOCOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 TCP Fairness and TCP Congestion Control . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 CRAFT Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Security Analysis of CRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.6 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
v
CHAPTER 5 JIM-BEAM: JAMMING AND INTERFERENCE
MITIGATION USING BEAM-FORMING ANTENNAS AND
RANDOMIZED ORIENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 System and Attacker Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.3 JIM-Beam Flooding Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.4 Discussion on JIM-Beam Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.5 Security Analysis of JIM-Beam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.7 Integrating Other Anti-Jamming Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.8 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
vi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Availability in the Lower Layers of a Wireless
Network
A group of computing devices are connected if they can communicate with
each other. Collaboratively, a group of connected computing devices can form
a computing network that enables participants to share resources from data
storage to computation ability. For example, users of a file-sharing network
can share files among themselves; and clients of a computing grid can share
idle computation cycles, memories, and storages. A single computing device
may support multiple clients – known as end hosts – each of which performs
a set of specific tasks. For example, a computer can simultaneously support
multiple browser windows, each of which represents an Internet flow that can
be considered a single end host. The ISO formally defines a common way
that these computing devices and end hosts communicate with each other,
known as the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model.
The OSI model presents a layered architecture in which each layer provides
service to the layer above it. Starting from the bottom, the physical (PHY)
layer handles the transmission and reception of raw bits over the commu-
nication channel. If the inter-device communication is done over a wired
medium (such as telephone wire or optical cables), the resulting computing
network is referred to as a wired computing network. Similarly, devices in a
wireless network communicate with each other using the wireless medium.
The data-link layer resides above and collects raw bits from the PHY layer
and delivers the collection of bits, known as a frame, to the layer above
it. In other words, the data-link layer provides the functional and proce-
dural means to transfer data between network entities. In particular, the
data-link layer contains a sublayer known as medium access control (MAC).
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The MAC sublayer provides accessing and addressing functionalities so that
multiple devices can share and communicate over a single communication
channel. Above the data-link layer sits the network layer that provides rout-
ing functionality in a network based on the addressing service provided by
the data-link layer. Above the network layer is the transport layer that pro-
vides end-to-end communication between applications on different devices.
Together, the PHY, data-link and MAC, network, and transport layers are
known as the lower layers of a network and provide connectivity between
devices.
Above the lower layers are the session, presentation, and application layers;
these three layers are collectively known as the upper layers. The upper layers
use the connectivity provided by the lower layers to support user applications.
These layers are not studied in this dissertation.
Instead, this dissertation focuses on the availability of the lower layers.
Availability, along with confidentiality and integrity, form the basic concepts
of information security. Indeed, a device, a protocol, or a network can enjoy
the highest level of confidentiality and integrity, but is still useless to end
users if it is not available.
While network applications can provide confidentiality and integrity by
using end-to-end encryption and data correcting codes, a faulty entity can
interrupt a computing network by disrupting the connectivity between de-
vices. The use of networked devices has permeated into almost every aspect
of our daily life, from entertainment such as online games to utility infras-
tructures such as a smart-grid. Consequently, network availability is essential
both to prevent inconvenience and to provide uninterrupted critical services.
Because the lower layers provide connectivity service to the higher layers,
providing availability at the lower layers of a network is essential in keeping
networks operational.
An attack that interrupts a service that is otherwise available is referred
to as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In this dissertation, I consider three
defense philosophies against DoS attacks targeting, and present case studies
of applying these philosophies in, the lower layers of a wireless network:
1. Detect misbehaviors to eliminate DoS attacks;
2. Enforce fairness to mitigate DoS attacks; and
2
3. Adopt randomization to escape DoS attacks.
1.2 Eliminating Denial-of-Service by Detecting
Misbehaviors
When the performance of a network suffers due to misbehaving insiders, we
can detect and eliminate the insider attackers, thereby returning the network
performance to normal. In Chapter 2, I present a novel location verifica-
tion protocol to reject false location claims, thereby making position-based
services available. For example, without the integrity of position claims, at-
tackers can easily introduce wormholes into, and thus disrupt, networks that
employ position-based routing. Part of the findings were published previously
in [1].
1.3 Mitigating Denial-of-Service by Enforcing Fairness
However, in some cases, it is difficult to distinguish whether suboptimal net-
work performance is caused by a malicious act or by under-provisioning the
resource. Specifically, some events may cause abnormal network usage in
time or location; we refer to these events as flash events.
For example, during the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia, many
Georgian servers and websites were overloaded with request queries and
brought oﬄine. Experts suspect these websites were targeted by DoS at-
tacks,1 even though the same effect may occur if many people suddenly and
simultaneously took an interest in the Georgian banking and political sys-
tems. In another example, when celebrity Michael Jackson passed away on
June 25, 2009, there was an abnormal amount of queries about him and
Google mistook the flash event for a DoS attack.2 Some previous work seeks
to distinguish flash events from malicious attacks using behavioral recogni-
tion [2]. While many different types of network resources can be exhausted,
we specifically restrict our discussions to the network resource of bandwidth
in Chapters 3 and 4.
1http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html
2googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/outpouring-of-searches-for-late-michael.html
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To make bandwidth available, we do not necessarily need to make a dis-
tinction between flash crowd and DoS attackers. We can provide availability
by enforcing fairness: as long as all network end hosts fairly share the commu-
nication medium, even if a portion of the network is experiencing congestion,
each end host sharing that portion of network suffers, but not more than the
rest of his peers. We adopt this approach to avoid the undesirable scenario of
mistaking a flash crowd as malicious DoS attackers, in which case a portion
of the flash crowd would experience self-induced unavailability.
There are many different notions of fairness. For example, in per-host
bandwidth-fairness, each end-host can be granted an equal share of the total
bandwidth; in per-host access-fairness, each end-host is granted an equal
opportunity in accessing the communication medium; and in per-host time-
fairness, each end-host is granted an equal time duration in accessing the
communication medium. In this dissertation, I first study how an attacker
can exploit the different notions of fairness so as to remain fair in one manner
while denying availability in another manner; the findings were published
in [3]. I then study how to enforce the de facto fairness of today’s Internet to
provide availability at the transport layer; part of the findings were published
in [4].
1.4 Escaping Denial-of-Service by Adopting
Randomization
When a network suspects there exist nearby misbehaving devices, yet wishes
not to devote resources either to detect the misbehaviors or to enforce fairness
among participants, the network can use randomization to opportunistically
escape from the DoS attack. That is, the network repeatedly attempts to
escape from DoS attacks. When successful, the network is able to bootstrap
other security properties.
In Chapter 5, I study how to escape DoS attacks at the physical layer –
jamming – by randomly orienting directional antennas to opportunistically
eliminate interferences.
4
CHAPTER 2
LOCATION VERIFICATION: AN
ESSENTIAL STEP IN SECURELY
PROVIDING LOCATION-BASED
SERVICES
In mobile and wireless networks, user location can be used to enhance network
performance. For example, location information of a user has been incorpo-
rated in many position-based routing schemes in sensor networks [5, 6, 7]
where power conservation is crucial. Learning the location of a receiver can
also better aid a transmitter in orienting his directional antenna. However,
if an attacker can successfully falsify his location claim in a network that
uses geographic routing, that attacker can easily create wormholes in the
network, and disrupt network connectivity by making the wormholes unus-
able. Therefore, to provide consistent service, all location claims should be
securely verified before being used by a network.
Several approaches to secure location verification attempt to ensure that
the user is within some circular region. These techniques generally assume a
verifier is at the center of that region, and use physical limitations to prevent
attackers outside of that region from successfully verifying the location. For
example, Brands and Chaum [8] propose the distance bounding protocol that
exploits the fact that attackers cannot send signals faster than the speed
of light. In this chapter, I propose to build a protocol on top of Brands
and Chaum’s distance bounding protocol, but extend it to securely verify a
specific location within the convex hull formed by the verifiers.
Throughout this chapter, I refer to the entity that claims and wishes to
prove its location as the prover ; and the entity that verifies such location
claim, the verifier. To determine that a prover P is within distance ` from
verifier V , the verifier can simply measure the round trip time. In particular,
if the verifier sends a challenge to the prover, and the prover can correctly
respond, so that the response reaches the verifier within time duration 2`/c,
then the prover (or an accomplice) must be located within a sphere centered
at V with radius `.
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My protocol is based on the concept of multilateration: if a prover P proves
to verifiers V1, . . . , Vn that he is within radius `i from Vi, then given there is
only one prover, he must be within the intersection of all n circles. Several
previously proposed location verification protocols use distance bounding and
multilateration. For example, Cˇapkun and Hubaux propose a multilateration
scheme that specifies a δ test and a point-in-triangle test [9].
Na¨ıve multilateration schemes, however, can be easily compromised: if the
verifiers perform distance bounding independently at different times, then an
attacker can move between the tests and prove his false location claim. Sas-
try et al. thus suggest the insight that a secure multilateration scheme must
use simultaneous verification [10]. However, Chandran et al. show that si-
multaneous multilateration, while necessary to provide correctness in location
verification, is insufficient to mitigate sophisticated collusion attacks [11].
In this chapter, I propose a simultaneous and intertwined verification pro-
tocol. The proposed verification protocol uses a novel challenge-response
scheme to limit the time delay in challenge processing. Furthermore, the
verifiers in the proposed protocol must be finely time-synchronized; prior
studies suggest two verifiers can be synchronized to within 4% of the cable
length between them. By neglecting the small delay in processing time and
the synchronization error, I prove, without compromising the false alarm rate,
that my protocol achieves the highest detection rate of false location claims
achievable by any protocols based solely on time-of-flight measurements.
I further show that as long as the network can detect the distance en-
largement attack, simultaneous multilateration is secure against the generic
collusion attack. I propose a method that detects distance enlargement at-
tack using signal strength difference.
2.1 Related Work
To verify a location claim that a prover is within a certain range from a
verifier, Brands and Chaum propose the distance bounding protocol [8] in
which the verifier rapidly exchanges challenges and responses with a prover
using radio waves. If the verifier can receive the correct response to challenge
C(i) within time t(i), the prover must, with high probability, reside within
6
a sphere of radius maxi
(
1
2
ct(i)
)
around the verifier, where c is the speed of
light.
In the mafia fraud attack [12], an attacker that is near the verifier acts as a
man-in-the-middle between the verifier and a benign prover that is far away.
Since it takes time for the attacker to forward a challenge to a benign user
and subsequently forward the response to the verifier, the distance bounding
protocol can effectively detect a mafia fraud attacker that claims to be closer
to the verifier than the benign prover. However, a prover can arbitrarily delay
his response so as to appear farther than he actually is, a misbehavior known
as the distance enlargement attack. Brands and Chaum propose mitigating
the distance enlargement attack by placing the verifier at the center of the
region of interest. Consequently, enlarging the perceived distance does not
benefit the prover.
Sastry et al. propose the Echo protocol [10] that uses an RF link for
verifier-to-prover challenges and uses an ultrasonic link for prover-to-verifier
responses. Thus if the prover responds within time t(i) in the ith round of
the protocol, the prover must be at most ` away from the verifier, where s is
the speed of sound and ` satisfies
max
i
(t(i)) =
`
c
+
`
s
.
Multilateration can be used to verify a precise location claim. Cˇapkun and
Hubaux propose two tests for secure multilateration [9]. When the prover
claims to be r away from a verifier V , and the perceived distance between the
prover and a verifier is `(i) = 1
2
ct(i) in the ith round of the distance bounding
protocol, the δ test limits the user’s location ambiguity by rejecting the claim
if
max
i
|r − `(i)| ≥ δ,
for some predefined δ. The point-in-triangle test ensures the claimed location
is within the triangle formed by three verifiers.
While the δ test and the point-in-triangle test are sufficient to prevent false
location claims from a single attacker, they cannot successfully defend against
the generic collusion attack [11]. In the generic collusion attack, multiple
attackers collaborate in an effort to deceive the verifiers into accepting an
incorrect location claim.
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For example, in Figure 2.1(a), the prover claims to be located at a distance
R away from all three verifiers. However, due to processing delay and error
in the location estimation, the prover may appear to be slightly farther away
from each of the verifiers. The verifiers thus allow a time uncertainty of up to
2δ/c, or a spatial uncertainty of δ. In Figure 2.1(b), the dashed lines denote
the region that is at most R ± δ away from each verifier. If the prover has
no processing delay, he must be located in the shaded region in the figure in
order to prove his location claim. In Figure 2.1(c), three colluding attackers
who share their cryptographic identities can each pass the δ test made by
one verifier. The attackers, after passing the δ tests, will also pass the point-
in-triangle test since the claimed location is indeed in the interior of the
triangle formed by the three verifiers. The verifiers then mistakenly accept
the false location claim of the colluding attackers. Sastry et al. thus observe
that multilateration must be done in a manner such that all verifications are
performed simultaneously [10].
Several studies propose collusion-resilient verification schemes that do not
solely rely on time-of-flight measurements. If the provers can be uniquely
identified, then collusion, where many provers pretend to share a single iden-
tity, is not possible. Cˇapkun and Hubaux suggest two schemes to mitigate
collusion attacks [13]. In the first scheme, the verifiers fingerprint all users,
thereby asserting that different users cannot act as one single entity. In the
second scheme, the provers are all given tamper-proof hardware; thus the
attackers cannot clone a node and subsequently collude. The first approach
requires additional assumptions about the system’s tolerance of the variabil-
ity of fingerprints and also the attackers’ ability to tune his own fingerprints.
The second approach, on the other hand, can be very expensive if special
hardware needs to be installed on a large number of provers. The approach
of using tamper-proof hardware to defend against colluding attackers was
independently proposed also by Singele´e and Preneel [14]. These two ap-
proaches are orthogonal to my proposed protocol and can be incorporated to
provide additional security features.
Cˇapkun et al. propose a location verification protocol where some verifiers
remain hidden and mobile [15]. Since the attackers are not aware of these
hidden verifiers, a forged signal sent by the attackers will not reach these
hidden verifiers at the correct time or incident angle, depending on whether
the underlying system uses time-of-flight measurements or angle-of-arrival
8
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(a) Prover is R away from all three verifiers
R + δ
R - δ
(b) Acceptance zone
R + δ
R - δ
(c) Colluding attackers
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the δ test
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measurements. Such an approach is secure if and only if the hidden mobile
verifiers can actually be made completely hidden. Chaudran et al. note an
attack scheme that uses trial and error to find the location of the hidden
verifiers if their mobility is limited [11].
Chandran et al. propose an attack algorithm that shows that any location
verification schemes based solely on time-of-flight measurements must be
susceptible to the generic collusion attack [11]. In this chapter, I show that
the collusion attacks can be defeated by preventing distance enlargement
attacks. In particular, I propose using the difference in signal strength to
detect distance enlargement attacks. Cai et al. independently propose a
similar approach in detecting and pairing close-by devices [16].
2.2 Attacker Model and System Assumptions
2.2.1 Attacker Model
In this chapter, I only consider attackers that possibly collude to deceive the
verifiers about their locations. Specifically, I do not consider attackers that
seek to disrupt the challenge-response channels in the verification system.
I also make no restriction on the information the attackers share among
themselves.
Cˇapkun and Hubaux gave an in-depth analysis and concluded that RF
time-of-flight based verification systems exhibit the best security properties
compared to other techniques, such as angle-of-arrival and ultrasound time-
of-flight techniques [9]. Since there is no known working communication
technique that is faster than the speed of light, I assume an attacker cannot
communicate with the set of verifiers or other colluding attackers faster than
the speed of light.
The round trip time-of-flight of an RF signal is thus at least 2`
c
, where `
is the physical length of the line-of-sight signal path between the prover and
the verifier. We calculate the perceived distance as λ = 1
2
ct, where t is the
measured round trip time-of-flight; a prover cannot decrease his perceived
distance beyond the length of the line-of-sight path from a verifier, but can
enlarge his perceived distance by delaying the response or sending the signal
along a longer path. The verifier can safely assume that the prover is located
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no farther away than the perceived distance. I assume the attackers are able
to instantaneously respond to challenges since it is difficult to determine any
meaningful lower bound in processing time.
Finally, and only for my optimized scheme that uses signal strength mea-
surements, I also assume that the attackers are sufficiently far away from
each verifier so that the attackers are in the far-field region of every verifier’s
antennas.
2.2.2 System Assumptions
While my proposed protocol makes very few assumptions about the attackers,
it requires that all verifiers be trustworthy, secure, and able to weakly time
synchronize among themselves. My proposed protocol also assumes that each
verifier Vi knows its own location locVi .
I assume that each verifier can communicate with every other verifier us-
ing a separate secure communication channel. These assumptions can be
achieved by having physically secure verifiers communicate over secure wired
links. I also assume that each prover shares a secret key with all verifiers.
The granularity to which verifiers can synchronize time among themselves
directly affects the accuracy of the location proof. To effectively synchronize
time, verifiers can synchronize over wires directly connecting them to each
other. Vook et al. show that using a crossover cable 1 m in length, two
HP5372A frequency and time interval analyzers can time synchronize and
filter the machine jitters so the standard deviation of the synchronized time
is 0.771 ns, equivalent to a spread of 2.5 ns with 99.7% confidence [17].
Ishikawa and Mita show that sensors connected using a 190 m LAN cable
can time synchronize to within 25 ns, equivalent to a distance uncertainty of
4% of the cable length [18].
My optimized protocol uses signal strength measurements and makes the
following radio model assumptions. First, an antenna’s far-field distance is
given by
`ff =
2G2
signal wavelength
,
where G is the maximum dimension of the antenna. Second, the receiver’s
system noise temperature Tsys is less than the typical noise temperature of
the quiet Sun, which is around 50,000 K at 2.4 GHz. For example, let a
11
Table 2.1: List of symbols and definitions
Symbol Definition
Vi The i
th verifier
P The prover
locA Location of A
l̂ocA Estimated or claimed location of A
ri The claimed distance between P and Vi
`i The line-of-sight distance between P and Vi
`′i The distance of the signal path between P and Vi
ui The uncertainty measured by Vi
δi Acceptance threshold of Vi
γ Path loss exponent
d Separation between antennas
λi The perceived distance between P and Vi
transmitter transmit a 2.4 GHz signal with bandwidth ∆f = 1 MHz using
an SMCANT-DI145 directional antenna,1 which has length 0.316 m. Let the
receiver also receive using an SMCANT-DI145 directional antenna; then the
far-field distance of the SMC antenna is at `ff = 1.66 m and the system
noise is given by
Nsys = kTsys∆f = −96.61 dbm,
where k is the Boltzmann constant. Finally, I use a log-distance path-loss
model. Since I assume the attackers are in the far-field, I do not consider the
signal behavior in the near-field, wherein the signal strength must be capped.
2.3 Simultaneous Multilateration
Since my proposed protocol uses only radio waves, I will normalize the dis-
tance and time with respect to the speed of light throughout the remainder
of this chapter. That is, a unit distance is defined to be the distance trav-
eled by radio wave over one unit time. Table 2.1 gives a list of symbols and
definitions.
1Data sheet available at: http://www.smc.com/files/AP/DS ANT.pdf
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2.3.1 The Simultaneous Multilateration Protocol
A secure multilateration scheme must be performed simultaneously by mod-
ifying the distance bounding protocol so that the prover simultaneously re-
sponds to the challenge from each verifier. If there are a total of N verifiers,
then each verifier sends a separate challenge, and the prover proves that he
has received all the challenges by combining all N challenges using a math-
ematical function. This function should have the property that when given
N inputs, it produces a deterministic output; however, when given M < N
inputs, all outputs are equally likely.
My protocol can use any modulation scheme and multiple access proto-
col so long as they provide the decoding speed required. However, for the
simplicity of describing my protocol, I adapt frequency shift keying for bit
transmission, and frequency division to allow multiple senders to send si-
multaneously. That is, a verifier Vi is allocated two frequencies, fi0 and fi1.
To transmit the bit 0, Vi transmits a single tone on frequency fi0, and to
transmit the bit 1, Vi transmits a single tone on frequency fi1. If the prover
detects a signal on fi0 and not on fi1, the prover decodes a 0 from Vi. If the
prover detects a signal on fi1 and not on fi0, the prover decodes a 1 from Vi.
Otherwise the prover makes no decision.
Rasmussen and Cˇapkun recently proposed using challenge reflection with
channel selection (CRCS) to realize the distance bounding protocol [19].
In CRCS, the single distance bounding verifier selects a frequency channel
on which to send his challenge; the prover then responds by mixing the
challenge with another sinusoid, whose frequency depends on a bit stream B
agreed between the prover and the verifiers. The verifier then verifies that the
offset between challenge and response frequencies corresponds to the correct
response. The authors show that the prover is able to receive, turn around,
and respond within less than 1 ns. I propose extending the CRCS protocol
for my simultaneous multilateration protocol, which I refer to as the sim-
CRCS protocol. In sim-CRCS, each verifier selects a different frequency; the
prover then responds by mixing all received challenges and a sinusoid based
on the agreed bit stream B. The processing time experienced by the prover
should be similar to that shown by Rasmussen and Cˇapkun since a mixer
can mix multiple inputs at once.
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In my protocol, the prover P initiates the verification request by first se-
curely submitting his claimed location l̂ocP using his shared secret with the
verifiers. All N verifiers then time synchronize among themselves using their
own secure channel. Each verifier Vi then chooses a challenge bit Ci and a
unique frequency fiCi , and then informs other verifiers of his choice. All veri-
fiers then collectively decide an arrival time τ , and each verifier calculates the
transmission time to transmit his challenge by subtracting from the agreed
arrival time the propagation time between the verifier and the prover. That
is,
Transmission time of Vi = τ− | locVi − l̂ocP |= τ − ri,
where ri is the claimed distance between prover and verifier Vi. Obviously,
practicality dictates that the transmission time be after the current time,
and this translates into a requirement for agreeing on τ . Each verifier finally
transmits a tone on fiCi at its transmission time so that all N challenges
arrive at the claimed location simultaneously at τ .
If the location claim is correct (i.e., l̂ocP = locP ), the prover receives all
challenges simultaneously at time τ , determines the responding frequency
by sim-CRCS, and then responds by broadcasting a tone on the correct
frequency, which is in turn received by all verifiers. For example, a prover can
receive all challenges from different bands using an ultra-wide-band antenna;
the prover then feeds the signal consisting of all challenges into a diode to
mix all challenges. This is equivalent to one round of bit exchange in the
original distance bounding protocol [8]. To perform another round of my
protocol, each verifier selects a fresh set of challenge frequencies and repeats.
When each verifier receives the response from the prover, the verifier first
checks if the response bit is correct. If the response bit value is incorrect, the
location claim is rejected. If the verifiers do not receive a response or if the
verifiers receive an ambiguous response (i.e., receiving both 0 and 1), then
without penalizing the prover, the verifiers will initiate the next round. If the
response bit value is correct, each verifier checks the elapsed time between
when the verifier sent his challenge and when the response was received.
Since the response bit is only one bit in length, the prover has a 50% chance
to reply correctly by simply guessing. As in the basic distance bounding
protocols, my protocol is run many rounds where a portion of responses must
be correct in order to exponentially diminish the probability that the prover
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guesses correctly every round. After each verifier has calculated the region
in which the prover must reside, the verifiers can intersect these regions to
verify the location claim.
2.3.2 Uncertainty: Quantitatively Studying the Security of
Timing-Based Location Verification Protocols
Let each verifier calculate the round trip time by taking the difference be-
tween the time when it sent the challenge and the time when it received the
response. If the claimed location is at a distance of ri from verifier Vi, and
the correct response is not received until 2`i after the challenge was sent,
then define the uncertainty to be ui = 2`i − 2ri. The amount of uncertainty
a verifier Vi accepts is given by a threshold δi, which can vary based on the
claimed location, the purpose of the location proof, and other factors. Once
each δi is determined, the location claim is accepted if
|ui| ≤ δi ∀Vi.
In location verification systems that use only time-of-flight measurements,
a sophisticated attacker can only be caught falsifying a location claim if he
cannot correctly respond within some allowed elapsed time. That is, a sophis-
ticated attacker can only be caught cheating if the uncertainty measured by
any verifier is greater than the threshold, since an attacker can use directional
antennas to inject verifier-specific delay when any measured uncertainty is
negative. In other words, the uncertainty (not its absolute value) can be con-
sidered a measure of the level of security provided by a location verification
protocol.
To analyze my proposed simultaneous multilateration protocol, let there
be a set of N verifiers V = {V1, . . . VN} and a prover P . Let the line-of-
sight distance and the claimed distance between prover P and verifier Vi be
`i and ri, respectively. In my protocol, each verifier Vi sends his challenge
at time −ri so that all N challenges reach the claimed location at time 0.
However, since the prover is actually `i away, the prover cannot collect all
challenges until time maxVn∈V (`n − rn). The prover then spends oi time
to process the challenges and respond to all verifiers. The response would
take `i to travel from P to verifier Vi for a total measured time-of-flight of
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`i + maxVn∈V (`n − rn) + ri + oi. The corresponding uncertainty measured by
verifier Vi is ui = `i− ri + maxVn∈V (`n − rn) + oi. As outlined in my attacker
model, my analyses in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 assume oi → 0.
2.4 Optimality of Simultaneous Multilateration
To show the optimality of my proposed protocol, I assume an ideal environ-
ment where both the processing delay oi and the synchronization errors are
negligible. By observing the incurred uncertainty, I can show that, without
compromising the false alarm rate, my protocol achieves the highest detec-
tion rate of false location claims that any location verification schemes based
solely on time-of-flight can provide.
I first note that a correct location claim is trivially accepted since the
measured uncertainty is negligible (oi → 0). I then show that an incorrect
location claim incurs the maximum uncertainty in my protocol. Equivalently,
if a false location claim can be detected by any other verification protocols
based solely on time-of-flight measurements, that false claim can also be
detected by my protocol.
My analysis is based on the real uncertainty, and not its absolute value.
This is because any sophisticated attacker can always delay his response to
compensate for negative uncertainty. In other words, the ability to reject
claims based on negative uncertainty does not provide any security benefit
independent of assumptions on attacker capability, and is thus not considered
in my analysis.
Theorem 2.4.1. The simultaneous multilateration protocol described in Sec-
tion 2.3.1, without compromising the false alarm rate, provides the highest
detection rate of false location claims that can be provided by any protocols
based solely on time-of-flight measurements. That is, with a given topology of
verifiers and provers, if a set of colluding attackers can deceive a particular
verifier in the proposed verification system, they would be able to deceive the
same verifier in all other verification systems based on time-of-flight mea-
surements alone.
Proof. I prove my theorem by showing that with a sophisticated attacker,
the uncertainty measured by any verifier in my system is an upper bound
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of the uncertainty measured by that same verifier in any systems based on
time-of-flight alone.
Let the collection of verifiers be V, and the set of challenge-transmitting
verifiers be Vt ⊆ V. I assume that the locations of all verifiers, transmitting
or silent, are known to the public since I am only interested in comparing
time-of-flight based verification systems. Let there be a set of provers P, and
prover Pk ∈ P is `ki away from Vi ∈ V. The set of provers collaboratively
seek to prove a single location claim that is ri away from verifier Vi. Finally,
let verifier Vi ∈ Vt transmit his challenge at time ti.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the challenges generated by the
set of transmitting verifiers Vt are intertwined. Meaning, the correct prover
response is dependent on all challenges sent by transmitting verifiers. If
only subsets of challenges are intertwined, then each corresponding subset
of transmitters can be considered as the set of transmitting verifiers and
the rest are considered as silent verifiers. Thus, a set of verifiers can be
regrouped into several sets with this observation. That is, any system that
does not intertwine all its challenges can be considered a set of systems, not
necessarily mutually exclusive, each intertwining all its challenges. The rest
of the proof shows that the uncertainty measured by each system, and thus
also the maximum measurement, is less than or equal to that measured by
the proposed verification protocol.
Observe that the challenge from Vi reaches the claimed location at ti + ri.
Since the challenges are intertwined, Vi expects the prover to respond at time
maxVi∈Vt (ti + ri) after all challenges reach the prover. Without considering
the processing time, oi, the response then reaches Vi at time
Ei = max
Vn∈Vt
(tn + rn) + ri.
The same challenge from Vi would reach Pk at ti + `ki. Hence, the earliest
response from a prover can reach verifier Vi at time
min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈Vt
(tn + `kn) + `ki
)
.
The corresponding uncertainty φi, measured by Vi, is simply the difference:
φi = min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈Vt
(tn + `kn) + `ki
)
− Ei.
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In the simultaneous multilateration system, all verifiers send challenges
that are intertwined, and the smallest uncertainty measured by verifier Vi is
ui = min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈V
(`kn − rn) + `ki − ri
)
.
Adding and subtracting maxVn∈Vt (tn + rn):
ui = min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈V
(`kn − rn) + `ki + max
Vn∈Vt
(tn + rn)
)
− Ei.
The minimization of ui is done over the set of provers, and is independent of
the maximization inside, performed over the set of verifiers V. Therefore, by
changing the maximization to be performed over the subset of transmitting
verifiers Vt, the uncertainty must decrease or remain the same:
ui ≥ min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈Vt
(`kn − rn) + `ki + max
Vn∈Vt
(tn + rn)
)
− Ei.
Since the sum of the maxima is larger than the maximum of the sum, collapse
the two maximum terms inside:
ui ≥ min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈Vt
(`kn − rn + tn + rn) + `ki
)
− Ei
= min
Pk∈P
(
max
Vn∈Vt
(`kn + tn) + `ki
)
− Ei
= φi.
n
2.5 Collusion Attack against Simultaneous
Multilateration
When a single prover makes a location claim, my intertwined verification
ensures that he is where he claimed because he must perform all the verifi-
cations simultaneously, and his response would be late to some verifiers if he
made a false location claim. However, while a single attacker cannot cheat
all the verifiers, he may be able to cheat a subset of verifiers. For example,
imagine three verifiers V1, V2, V3 forming a regular triangle, an attacker sit-
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of an attacker that is near one of verifiers making a
false location claim
ting next to verifier V1, and a claimed location at the geometric center of the
triangle as shown in Figure 2.2. Let the distance between the verifiers and
the center be r. All three verifiers would send challenges at time −r and
expect the correct response at time r. The attacker receives a challenge from
V1 at time −r, and challenges from V2, V3 at time
(√
3− 1) r < r. Thus,
by delaying his response and transmitting using a directional antenna, the
attacker is able to respond to only verifier V1 at the expected time r.
Since one attacker may attack a subset of verifiers, a set of attackers may
be able to collude and attack the entire system in a distributed manner.
In the rest of this section, I give a mathematical model that allows us to
completely characterize the feasibility of collusion attacks.
From Section 2.3.2, I observe that the uncertainty measured by verifier Vi
is
ui = (`i − ri) + max
n
(`n − rn) ,
where `i is the perceived distance from the prover to verifier Vi and ri is the
distance from the claimed location to verifier Vi. An attacker can deceive
verifier Vi if ui ≤ 0. In the example given above,
max
n
(`n − rn) = max
n
`n − r = (
√
3− 1)r
and
`1 − r1 = −r1 = −r
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Figure 2.3: Hyperbolic contour of the difference in distances
for a sum that is less than zero.
To completely characterize my system, one needs to analyze the quantity
`i− ri, the difference in the line-of-sight distance from attacker to verifier Vi,
and the distance from the claimed location to Vi. It is known that a hyperbola
with foci f1 and f2 has the property that the differences in distances from
any points on the hyperbola to the foci have the same magnitude. Therefore,
let the attacker and the claimed location be the foci; then the contour of the
quantity `i − ri is simply a collection of hyperbolas. This section analyzes
two special cases: the first scenario has three verifiers forming a triangle, and
the second scenario has infinitely many verifiers densely distributed on the
boundary of a convex space. In both cases, the claimed location is assumed
to be inside the convex hull. These two cases present the two extremes in
number of verifiers used in a location verification system.
To analyze both cases, I first orient the prover and the claimed location so
that the prover is at −d and the claimed location is at +d on the x-axis as
shown in Figure 2.3. I will refer to the contour that is perpendicular to the
x-axis as the y-axis; this contour presents the collection of points that are
equidistant from the prover and from the claimed location. Each hyperbola
is made up of two contours that are symmetric about the y-axis. The two
contours have the same magnitude but opposite signs. In particular, the
contour to the right of the y-axis (closer to the claimed location) represents
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a positive value of `i−ri = a > 0, and, similarly, the contour to the left of the
y-axis (closer to the prover) represents a negative value of `i − ri = −a < 0.
The first scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.4(a). Since the claimed loca-
tion is in the interior of the verifier triangle, one of the verifiers, V1, must
be located to the right of the claimed location, on the contour `1 − r1. Fur-
thermore, `1− r1 > 0 since it lies on a contour closer to the claimed location
than the prover. Since the contour plot is also symmetric about the x-axis,
without loss of generality, let the verifier V1 have a negative y value. Then
draw the asymptote of this particular hyperbolic contour running through
quadrants II and IV, as shown in Figure 2.4(a).
A contour that represents a value less than the opposite of the `1 − r1
contour must be entirely to the other side of the hyperbolic asymptote. In
other words, an attacker can deceive a verifier only if that verifier is located to
the left of the hyperbolic asymptote. Let verifier V3 be vulnerable to attack
because it measures a negative uncertainty; that is, V3 is located to the left
of the asymptote. Now draw a ray from verifier V1 through the claimed
location, and another ray from verifier V3 through the claimed location. The
two rays are named ray1 and ray3, respectively, as shown in Figure 2.4(a).
The two rays intersect at the claimed location, and the other verifier V2
must be located above2 both rays in order to enclose the claimed location.
However, ray1 never intersects the asymptote because it is steeper than the
asymptote; ray3 intersects the asymptote once, but such intersection must
be between V3 and the claimed location. Ergo, V2 can only be located on the
right side of the asymptote, and `2 − r2 > − (`1 − r1).
Consequently, if there are three verifiers enclosing the claimed location,
then an attacker can cheat at most one verifier (e.g. V3), by himself; thus
regardless of where the attacker is, he needs at least two other colluding
attackers to deceive the simultaneous multilateration system with three ver-
ifiers.
In the second scenario, let there be infinitely many verifiers densely dis-
tributed on the boundary of a convex space. Since the verifiers are densely
distributed, there must be at least one verifier located on the ray from the
claimed location to positive infinity, call it Vpos, and observe `pos− rpos = 2d.
2V2 is located “above” the rays because the segment connecting V1 and V3 is below the
claimed location. Had I chosen V1 with positive y value, V2 would be located “below” the
rays.
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Figure 2.4: Illustrations of the scenarios studied in Section 2.5
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If the prover is located outside the convex space, as shown in Figure 2.4(b),
then no verifiers are located on the −2d contour, which is a ray from the
prover to negative infinity. Consequently, no verifier can be cheated by the
attacker. If the prover is otherwise located inside the convex space, as shown
in Figure 2.4(c), then only the verifiers located on the ray from the prover to
negative infinity can be cheated. Since an attacker is needed in every orien-
tation to deceive the verifiers, the attacker needs the same order of colluders
as there are verifiers in the system.
Because all convex hulls can be partitioned into triangles, if the claimed
location is inside the convex hull, it must be inside at least one triangle. I thus
establish a very loose bound that attackers need at least two other colluders
to deceive a simultaneous multilateration system with three or more verifiers.
2.6 Mitigating the Distance Enlargement Attack
In this section, I explore a possible optimization that can detect collusion
attacks, and reject false claims from colluding attackers. In Section 2.3.2, I
show that the uncertainty measured by verifier Vi is
ui = `i − ri + max
n
(`n − rn) .
If there exists a method so that the length of signal path between a prover
and a verifier can be accurately measured, then the verifier could enforce that
the signal travels a distance consistent with the claimed distance: `i ≈ ri.
The measured uncertainty then increases to
ui ≈ max
n
(`n − rn) ≥ 0.
Hence, ui is close to 0 only if the claimed location is correct.
Since the distance bounding protocol already provides an accurate up-
per bound on the distance between a prover and a verifier, eliminating the
distance enlargement attack is sufficient to also eliminate the generic collu-
sion attack when using simultaneous multilateration. I propose using signal
strength difference to obtain a lower bound on the distance between a prover
and a verifier. Even though Cai et al. propose using a similar approach
to verify nearby neighbors [16], this is a first attempt to mitigate the dis-
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tance enlargement attack, which has been generally accepted as an inherent
weakness in secure location verification schemes [9].
In my proposed optimization, each verifier is equipped with two highly-
directive antennas that are placed so the orientations are almost collinear
without shadowing each other. After receiving a location claim, each verifier
orients both its direction antennas toward the claimed location. Each verifier
then uses each of his antennas to measure the signal strength of the prover’s
response. Let the distance between the antennas be d, the line-of-sight dis-
tance and the length of the actual signal path from the prover to the closer
antenna be ` and `′, respectively. The length-of-signal-path of a non-line-of-
sight signal can be longer than the physical distance between the prover and
the verifier. The resulting measured uncertainty is u = `′−r+maxn (`n − rn).
Subtract the measured signal strength of the farther antenna from that of
the closer antenna, and obtain
∆s(`′, γ) = 10γ log
(
`′ + d
`′
)
≥ 0 dB,
where γ is called the path loss exponent.
If the path loss exponent is consistent over time and space, then the dif-
ference in signal strength can provide an accurate distance measurement.
However, because the path loss exponent varies with respect to time and
space, we must analyze the extent the path loss exponent can be used to
mitigate the generic collusion attack. In particular: if the length of the sig-
nal path between a prover and a verifier is `′, but the prover claims to be
r > `′ away from the verifier, what is the threshold `
′
r
< η such that a verifier
can detect the distance enlargement attack and reject the location claim?
Since the two verifier antennas and the prover are collinear, the paths from
the prover to the two directional antennas are very similar and should result
in similar path loss exponents. In order for a response to be accepted, its
measured signal strength difference must be larger than that induced by the
claimed distance and minimum path loss exponent ∆s(r, γmin) and smaller
than that induced by the claimed distance the maximum path loss exponent
∆s(r, γmax):
10γmin log
(
1 +
d
r
)
≤ 10γ log
(
1 +
d
`′
)
≤ 10γmax log
(
1 +
d
r
)
.
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Simplifying the inequality on the right-hand side:
`′ ≥ d(
exp
(
γmax
γ
ln
(
1 + d
r
))− 1) .
If the term d
r
is small, then the above expression can be approximated
using first-order Taylor expansion: `
′
r
≥ γ
γmax
≥ γmin
γmax
, or min `′ = r γmin
γmax
.
This requirement in measured distance enables us to enforce that the length
of signal path between a prover and a verifier is at least a constant factor of
the prover’s claim. For example, if I consider γmin = 2 and γmax = 4, then a
verifier using signal strength difference can enforce that the distance between
itself and a prover is at least half that claimed. This property improves the
uncertainty measured by verifier Vi to
ui = max
{
`i, ri
γmin
γmax
}
− ri + max
Vn∈V
(`n − rn).
2.7 Security Analysis of the Optimized Scheme
Instead of the more cost-effective choice of two omni-directional antennas, I
choose to equip each verifier with two highly-directive antennas in order to
take advantage of two desirable properties:
1. Directionality enables both antennas to hear the same response; and
2. Directivity alleviates the impact of fading by rejecting signals from
secondary paths.
A directional antenna does not suffer as much from multipath as an omni-
directional antenna would; thus using highly-directive antennas in my proto-
col also mitigates fading and provides a more consistent path loss exponent.
Early experimental data confirms that fading rate is inversely correlated with
directivity [20]. I thus do not expect fading to greatly impact the performance
of my proposed protocol.
While the angle-of-arrival measurements can also be valuable in verifying
a location claim, the angle-of-arrival measurements are susceptible to the re-
flection attack, in which an attacker uses a well-placed reflector to redirect
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his transmission and makes himself appear to be located at the correct di-
rection. I thus do not explicitly use the angle-of-arrival measurements in my
verification protocol.
2.7.1 The Weak-Signal Attack
As stated in Section 2.2.1, the system noise of a verifier can be as high as
-91.61 dBm. Thus, if a signal is weak when it reaches the verifier, it is
possible that a benign prover is classified as a distance-enlarging attacker.
Consequently, I propose requiring that the smaller of the measured signal
strengths (and not the difference) must be much greater than twice the
noise, or -88.60 dBm, in order for a verifier to accept or deny a response.
However, from a security perspective, intentionally weakening one’s signal is
not beneficial because it does not improve the claim acceptance probability.
2.7.2 Attack Using Multiple Highly-Directive Antennas
The signal strength difference test relies on measuring the strength difference
of a single signal. Thus, if a set of colluding attackers is able to transmit
signals such that each of a verifier’s antenna receives a different signal, then
the colluders can deceive the verifier in a similar manner as deceiving the
verification system.
Figure 2.5(a) illustrates this attack. In this section, I analyze the plausi-
bility of this attack. For simplicity, and only in this section, I assume the
verifier uses sectored antennas with no side lobes. Let the beam-width of
each sectored antenna be θ; then as shown in Figure 2.5(a), there exists,
between the two antenna beam-cones, a gap of size α = d sin θ
2
.
Let an attacker be equipped with two antennas. The attacker’s primary
antenna AP1 responds to both the verifier’s two directional antennas AV 1
and AV 2. Then let the attacker’s secondary directional antenna AP2 be able
to compensate for the primary response at only the farther of the verifier’s
antennas AV 2. The attacker can then adjust the signal strength difference
even if the attacker is closer than claimed.
In other words, the attacker’s secondary antenna AV 2 must be smaller in
dimension than α in order to fit within the gap of beam-cones at the verifier.
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(a) Illustration of the feasibility of attack: α is large enough to fit an antenna
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(b) Illustration of when the attacker does not know the exact verifier orientation and both
attacker antennas are heard by both verifier antennas
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(c) Illustration of when the attacker does not know the exact verifier orientation and
the attacker’s secondary antenna is outside of the beam-width of the verifier’s secondary
antenna
Figure 2.5: Illustration of the attack in which an attacker is equipped with
two antennas and seeks to use the secondary antenna to compensate for the
primary antenna
27
Suppose d is 0.562 m, which equals to 4.5 times the wavelength of a 2.4 GHz
signal, and the verifier uses two directional antennas with beam-width of
10◦, then the size of AV 2 must be less than 0.05 m, or 0.4 times the signal
wavelength. In order to radiate a signal, an antenna must be greater than
one-tenth of the signal wavelength; thus this attack is indeed plausible.
However, the verifier can also patch this vulnerability by injecting random-
ness into the orientation of its directional antennas so long as the claimed
location is within the beam-cones of both antennas AV 1 and AV 2. This
scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.5(b) and Figure 2.5(c). Consequently, the
attacker cannot know the exact correct placement of his antennas, so his sec-
ondary antenna only affects one of two verifying antennas. Hence the verifier
can detect and eliminate the attacker with high probability over multiple
protocol rounds.
2.8 Evaluation
2.8.1 Methodology
I perform Monte Carlo simulations using MATLAB to study the effectiveness
of simultaneous multilateration. In particular, I study the impact on claim
acceptance from synchronization errors between verifiers. I also show that
simultaneous distance bounding is more resilient to the collusion attack than
na¨ıve multilateration.
I simulate a distance bounding system with three verifiers, z apart from
each other, forming a regular triangle. I let the uncertainty threshold δ be
one-tenth of the distance between the verifiers and their geometric center
(δ = 0.1 z√
3
). From prior studies, I assume that each verifier suffers a time
synchronization error that is normal-distributed with mean 0 ns. The syn-
chronization error between each verifier’s clock and the ground truth is within
the larger of 3 ·0.771 = 2.31 ns and 4% of the distance between verifiers with
99.7% probability [17, 18]. Based on prior study [19], I simulate the case
where each prover suffers from a uniformly-random processing delay between
0.8 and 1 ns.
To study the impact of synchronization on the multilateration perfor-
mance, I simulate one prover that seeks to prove a location claim at the
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geometric center of the verification triangle, i.e. r = z√
3
, where the verifiers
are 10 m < z < 100 m away from each other. I let each prover be uniformly-
randomly located x away from the claimed location, where 0.03 ≤ x
r
≤ 3. For
each simulation scenario, I perform 100,000 runs and calculate the average
acceptance probability. The acceptance probability can be seen as a measure
of the required attackers’ effort to defeat a location verification system.
To study how resilient my proposed schemes are against the generic col-
lusion attack, I consider the case in which the three verifiers are z = 100 m
away from each other. I then let there be three colluding provers, uniformly-
randomly located x away from the claimed location, where again 0.03 ≤ x
r
≤
3. I similarly calculate the acceptance probability when the verifiers use
1. na¨ıve multilateration,
2. simultaneous multilateration, and
3. simultaneous multilateration with signal-strength difference measure-
ment.
In my simulation, when the verifiers use signal-strength difference measure-
ment to mitigate distance enlargement attack, each prover that is too close
to verifier Vi uses a longer signal path of distance `
′
i to artificially enlarge the
perceived distance:
`i < `
′
i =
d(
exp
(
γmin
γmax
ln
(
1 + d
r
))− 1) .
The attacker’s strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.6. In the illustration, the
line-of-sight distance between the attacker and verifier V3 is too short, and
the attacker uses an alternate signal path `′3 (for example, by setting up a
curved waveguide) that satisfies the above inequality. In my simulation, I
consider a scenario where the path loss exponent is relatively consistent, and
let γmax = 2.5 and γmin = 2.
To evaluate collusion resilience, I consider not only the acceptance prob-
ability, but also the normalized distance between provers and the claimed
location (x/r) beyond which all location claims are rejected. That is, ξ =
arg min
{
x
r
| all location claims are rejected}. ξ is an important factor in de-
termining how far a set of sophisticated colluders can reside and still deceive
the verifiers.
29
Verifier 1
Verifier 3 Verifier 2
Claim
Attacker
r
z
x
l2
l3'
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the attack strategy
2.8.2 Simulation Results
When there is a single prover, my simulation result is shown in Figure 2.7.
For na¨ıve multilateration, I only show the results when verifiers are 10 m
apart. This is because
1. Each verifier performs distance bounding separately; hence verifier-
specific synchronization errors do not impact the outcome; and
2. The uncertainty threshold is chosen to be the distance between verifiers
multiplied by a constant.
Thus, if verifiers are farther than 10 m apart, the provers’ processing delays
contribute less to the measured uncertainty, and the acceptance probability
increases.
To show the impact of verifier synchronization errors, I draw a different
line for each choice of the distance between verifiers. I show the acceptance
probability on the y-axis, and the normalized prover deviation x/r on the x-
axis. I observe that the performance of simultaneous multilateration, taking
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Figure 2.7: Probability that a location claim is accepted given the prover is
x away from the claimed location
into account the synchronization errors between verifiers, is comparable to
the na¨ıve multilateration.
When there are three colluding attackers, I show my simulation result in
Figure 2.8. To study the performance difference, I draw a different line for
each verification protocol. I observe that when three colluding attackers are
present, na¨ıve multilateration might accept the location claim even when the
attackers are outside the convex hull of the verifiers (ξ > 2). This shows that
collusion can significantly impact the security of na¨ıve multilateration. Simul-
taneous multilateration mitigates the collusion attack so that the colluding
attackers must be significantly more sophisticated to deceive the verifiers.
However, the colluders can still successfully attack while outside the convex
hull formed by verifiers (ξ ≈ 1.3). Finally, by using signal-strength-difference
to mitigate the distance enlargement attack, the verifiers can reject all claims
made by provers located x > 0.5r (ξ ≈ 0.5) away from the claimed location.
In other words, in this example topology, signal-strength-difference-test of-
fers the strong property that the colluders cannot successfully attack once
outside the convex hull formed by the verifiers.
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Figure 2.8: Probability that a location claim is accepted given three
colluding attackers are all x away from the claimed location
2.9 Chapter Summary
The distance bounding protocol provides a strong result in verifying that
a prover is within a certain distance from a verifier. However, in order to
provide reliable position-based service, the network must securely verify the
user’s precise location information. In this chapter, I propose a verification
protocol that is based on simultaneous multilateration. I show that, without
compromsing the false alarm rate, the proposed protocol achieves the highest
detection rate of false alarm claims achievable by any verification system
based solely on time-of-flight measurements.
I also show an extension of the simultaneous multilateration protocol that
can detect and eliminate the distance enlargement attack. By eliminating
the distance enlargement attack, the simultaneous multilateration protocol
can completely mitigate the generic collusion attack.
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CHAPTER 3
PARTIAL DEAFNESS: A MAC LAYER
ATTACK THAT EXPLOITS DIFFERENT
NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS
Wireless networks based on the IEEE 802.11 standard [21] are widely de-
ployed today for governmental, commercial, and personal uses. Attacks
against the 802.11 standard can cause widespread security issues ranging
from mere inconvenience to privacy breaches and machine compromise. Much
attention is dedicated to both possible attacks and their respective solutions.
Heusse et al. demonstrate that even without any malicious intent or mis-
behavior, a slow connection can still significantly impact the transfer speed of
a fast connection because of the fairness mechanism implemented by the Dis-
tributed Coordination Function (DCF) at the Medium Access Control layer
(MAC) [22]. In particular, since the IEEE 802.11 DCF seeks to fairly grant
access opportunities to each station, each station has an equal opportunity to
be the next station to transmit a data packet; thus a fast connection regularly
has to wait until a slow connection finishes its reception. This performance
anomaly together with excessive channel reservation can be viewed as head-
of-queue blocking at the wireless medium since the DCF cannot schedule the
next station until the current transmitter is finished.
In this chapter, I present the partial deafness attack, a DoS attack that
builds on the observation of Heusse et al. [22]. Partial deafness is based
on the fact that fair access opportunities may result in significantly unfair
channel access durations. My attack is based on the realization that most
commercial access points are implemented with only a single data queue
because the 802.11 standard does not specify or recommend any queuing
behavior. Thus, if a transmitted packet is not acknowledged, the packet
triggers retransmissions and possible rate adaptation (i.e. slowing the data
rate), thereby creating head-of-queue blocking at the access point. The head-
of-queue blocking then drastically degrades the performance of the wireless
network.
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Like other DoS attacks, the partial deafness attack does not aim to give
better performance to the attacker, but to reduce the performance of other
users. In the partial deafness attack, each attacker artificially worsens his
link quality by intentionally failing to acknowledge packet receptions. The
partial deafness attack impacts the system in a manner similar to a legiti-
mate user with a slow connection. However, by exploiting the retransmission
mechanism specified by the 802.11 standard, the impact of our attack be-
comes much more devastating, especially to the Transport Control Protocol
(TCP) performance of other users.
The partial deafness attack targets the MAC-layer protocol but does not
require the attacker to modify the MAC protocol implementation at his sta-
tion. For example, an attacker can suppress an acknowledgment by turning
off the network interface card any time between the start and completion of
packet reception. In Section 3.4.1, we detail our implementation of a partial
deafness attacker by enabling and disabling the acknowledgment function in
the driver of a commercial Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) card. In
other words, our attack works even when the attacker abides by the same
MAC rules as every other node.
An attacker can simply move farther away from the access point to phys-
ically worsen his channel condition and impact other users. However, this
approach requires the attacker to find a location such that the channel con-
dition is sufficiently weak to regularly result in retransmission, and yet is
not weak enough to result in disassociation. If fading causes the attacker to
be disconnected, then the attacker cannot impact other users; on the other
hand, if fading improves the attacker’s channel condition intermittently, then
other users can also intermittently experience improved transfer rate.
Since the partial deafness attack exploits the fairness mechanism and the
head-of-queue blocking at the access point, many different methods can mit-
igate the attack. In this chapter, I propose enforcing time-fairness at the
access point instead of relying on a single First-In-First-Out (FIFO) data
queue. My proposed scheme can be implemented entirely in software, and
does not require any changes to the widely used 802.11 MAC protocol. The
result shows that different notions of fairness can result in significantly dif-
ferent network performance; thus, when designing a fairness-enforcing DoS
mitigation protocol, the designer must be careful with the choice of fairness
metric.
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3.1 Overview of IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard [21] in its various forms is now widely imple-
mented and deployed in wireless networks. In infrastructure mode, users
share the wireless medium in order to download and upload data via an ac-
cess point. The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies multiple transmission rates,
which a station can choose based on the signal strength and link quality be-
tween the communicating stations. There is a natural trade-off between the
transmission rate and error rate dictated by the rate distortion theorem [23].
Rate adaptation such as Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) [24] and SampleRate [25]
have been widely implemented to adaptively choose an optimal transmission
rate as link quality varies. Rate diversification is thus common in any 802.11
network.
At the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, the IEEE 802.11 standard
specifies methods to fairly share the wireless link among users. The Dis-
tributed Coordination Function (DCF) is the predominant MAC protocol in
today’s wireless networks. It seeks to fairly share the medium by offering
equal access opportunity to all users. Another MAC protocol is specified in
the 802.11 standard: the Point Coordination Function (PCF); however, few
vendors implement the PCF.
The DCF provides access opportunity fairness by using random backoff.
Each station in 802.11 maintains a Contention Window (CW). After any
broadcast transmission or successful unicast transmission, the contention
window is reset to CWmin, and it never increases beyond a value CWmax.
When station A wishes to send a frame, it first performs carrier sensing for
the DCF InterFrame Space (DIFS)1 to determine whether or not the medium
is busy. If the medium is not busy for that entire period, then A can im-
mediately send the data frame; otherwise A picks a random backoff value
uniformly distributed over interval [0,CW], where CW is the current value
of the contention window. Each time the medium is no longer busy, A waits
DIFS, and if the medium is still not busy, decrements its backoff value by
one for every slot time the medium continues to be free. When A detects
that the channel is once again busy, it stops decrementing the backoff value
and repeats the process of waiting for the channel to become idle, waiting
1DIFS = SIFS + 2 × Slot Time; SIFS and Slot Time are listed in Table 3.1
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Table 3.1: Slot time, Short InterFrame Space (SIFS), minimum and
maximum contention window (CW) values of the corresponding
transmission mode in the physical layer: frequency hopping spread
spectrum (FHSS), direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), infrared (IR),
and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)
PHY mode Slot Time SIFS CWmin CWmax
FHSS 50 µs 28 µs 15 1023
DSSS 20 µs 10 µs 31 1023
IR 8 µs 10 µs 63 1023
OFDM 9 µs 16 µs 15 1023
DIFS, and counting down its remaining backoff value. Once A’s backoff value
reaches zero, A starts its transmission.
When station B successfully receives a unicast transmission from A, B
waits for a Short InterFrame Space (SIFS), and, if the channel is idle, im-
mediately returns an acknowledgment. Thus, if a station A sends a unicast
transmission and does not receive a MAC-layer acknowledgment for that
transmission, A will believe that the packet did not successfully reach B
(broadcast messages are not acknowledged so they are always considered suc-
cessful; previous work has shown that such packets are therefore delivered
less reliably [26]). A will then retransmit the unsuccessful frame following
an exponential backoff procedure. The contention window for the nth trans-
mission is given by
CW[1] = CWmin
CW[n] = min (2CW[n− 1] + 1,CWmax)
and A’s station retry count is incremented by one. If the station retry count
exceeds the retry limit,2 the frame is discarded; otherwise A chooses a new
backoff value on the interval [0,CW[n]] and repeats the process of waiting
for DIFS and counting down the backoff time as it did for the original trans-
mission.
The slot time, SIFS, and contention window are dictated by the trans-
mission mode at the physical layer. Table 3.1 shows various physical layer
2The 802.11 standard specifies two retry limits, ShortRetryLimit = 7, and Lon-
gRetryLimit = 4; typical packets are retransmitted with ShortRetryLimit
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transmission modes with their corresponding slot time, SIFS, and contention
window.
3.2 Related Work
The IEEE 802.11 standard is widely deployed due to the unlicensed spectrum
in which it operates and the low cost of client devices and access points.
As a result, the security of 802.11 attracts much attention. In particular,
most research on MAC security focuses on the requirements of confidential-
ity and integrity. The original security protocol, Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP), is designed to provide privacy and authenticity of data. However,
Fluhrer et al. note that weakness in the encryption algorithm used by WEP
can be exploited to allow the discovery of session keys [27]. Numerous related
attacks are described in the literature [28, 29].
While a cryptographic attack has strong adverse effects on users’ privacy
and a protocol’s confidentiality and integrity, our work considers another type
of attack where the attacker seeks only to deny service to other users. That is,
the attacker aims to reduce a protocol’s availability. Specifically, we consider
the attacks against the MAC-layer protocol specified in 802.11 rather than
the pure resource consumption attacks such as the jamming attack.
Attacks on the 802.11 MAC protocol can exploit management vulnera-
bilities. Bellardo and Savage implement and demonstrate an attack that
targets the authentication/association scheme of 802.11 [30]. Bellardo and
Savage note that the deauthentication and disassociation messages are not
encrypted; thus an attacker can easily forge these messages. The attacker
can then send the deauthentication message to the access point before the
client’s data is received, or the attacker can send the disassociation message
to the client before the client’s data is transmitted. Ferreri et al. [31] de-
scribe DoS attacks against an access point’s association and authentication
mechanisms.
Attacks on the 802.11 MAC can also exploit media access vulnerabilities.
Bellardo and Savage also note that the 802.11 carrier sense mechanism can
be easily exploited. For example, in 802.11 networks, a node can only send
data during a certain time period after the channel stops being busy. In
particular, if not due to retransmission or fragmentation, a user can only
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transmit data DCF InterFrame Space (DIFS) after the channel is available;
otherwise the user can transmit data Short InterFrame Space (SIFS) after,
where SIFS < DIFS. A very simple method to deny service is to send a
short burst every SIFS. Bellardo and Savage present a more sophisticated
scheme exploiting the virtual carrier sense mechanism. The 802.11 standard
specifies that the MAC frame header of all packets should contain a duration
field, which specifies how long others have to wait before transmission is
allowed in order to avoid collision. Users update their Network Allocation
Vector (NAV) with this duration information and keep quiet for the specified
duration. Thus an attacker can repeatedly request long channel occupancy
time, thereby starving normal clients of channel occupancy.
The benefit of attacking the duration field rather than sending a short
burst every SIFS is the low amount of power used to carry out the attack.
In the duration field attack, an attacker simply initiates a Request to Send
(RTS)/ Clear to Send (CTS) handshake along with the specified duration.
The handshake in theory would keep the channel busy for roughly 30 ms.
The short burst approach, on the other hand, requires sending a short burst
every SIFS, or 10 µs in 802.11b/g networks. My proposed attack performs
even better in terms of power saving for the attackers; in particular, the
partial deafness attack can easily occupy 100 ms of channel time without
having to send any messages. Moreover, the partial deafness attack does not
require the attacker to have better service, higher power, or closer distance
to the access point. Finally, the partial deafness attack works on every access
point tested; however, the duration field attack does not work in many real
systems because most vendors do not implement the 802.11 specification
correctly [30].
Heusse et al. point out that when a client uses a lower bit rate than
others in an 802.11 network, the performance of all clients is considerably
degraded [22]. Tan and Guttag subsequently suggest that time fairness can
mitigate this performance anomaly and provide better throughput for the
WLAN [32]. In this chapter, I present an attacker that exploits the conclusion
of Heusse et al. by artificially and intentionally creating rate disparities. I
show that access point retransmissions exacerbate the anomaly by creating
head-of-queue blocking at the access point’s data queue. I then adapt the
principle of Tan and Guttag’s solution and show how to mitigate the partial
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Figure 3.1: Partial deafness attack
deafness attack by implementing time fairness at the access point’s data
queue.
3.3 The Partial Deafness Attack
3.3.1 Description
In this section, I present the partial deafness attack, which partly exploits the
retransmission mechanism of the 802.11 protocol to reduce the bandwidth
of non-attacking nodes. In the partial deafness attack, the attacker, upon
receiving a unicast data frame addressed to it, intentionally fails to send a
timely acknowledgment for at least a portion of those data frames. Though
previous work has suggested denial-of-service attacks against IEEE 802.11
by exploiting management vulnerabilities, my proposed attack stands out
because it substantially reduces the bandwidth available to legitimate nodes
without requiring the attacker to have superior connection quality. That
is, an attacker with lower transmission power, fewer computation resources,
and located farther away than a normal client can still significantly degrade
service to all the normal clients within the network.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, when a unicast transmission is not acknowl-
edged, an 802.11 station will normally transmit a frame up to seven times
before it gives up and discards the frame. An attacker can thus fail to ac-
knowledge the first six transmissions. In addition, senders in 802.11 employ
rate adaptation (e.g. Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) [24], or SampleRate [25]) to
maximize the throughput of the channel. When a receiver repeatedly fails
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to receive transmissions at one bit rate, the sender chooses a lower bit rate
in an attempt to successfully deliver the packet. Eventually the sender will
choose the lowest possible rate, called the base rate, to deliver packets to the
attacker.
Since most 802.11 networks are infrastructure networks in which clients
connect directly to an access point, and most traffic is directed to or received
from an access point, the behavior of an access point plays an important
role in the fairness perceived by a station. The 802.11 standard does not
specify or recommend any queuing behavior at the access point, so most
commercial access points use a single queue. Thus all packets are treated with
the same priority and each packet is completed before subsequent packets can
be serviced, regardless of the number of retransmissions or the rate that is
selected for those retransmissions. The attacker can thus induce the access
point to spend a large amount of time to transmit to the attacker, thereby
drastically decreasing the time allocated to the normal clients and reducing
the overall throughput.
3.3.2 Analysis
I first analyze the impact of the partial deafness attack in 802.11b, where
the maximum rate is 11 Mbps and the base rate is 1 Mbps. I then use
a theoretical analysis to show that rate diversity exacerbates the problem;
thus, commonly deployed 802.11b/g networks, in which the maximum and
base rates are 54 Mbps and 1 Mbps, respectively, are even more susceptible
to our attack.
To quantify the degree of imbalance caused by the partial deafness attack,
we consider a case in which a normal client and a malicious client share one
base station. We call the normal client Alice; the malicious client, Mallory;
and base station, Bob. In our example, Alice and Mallory have the same
link quality to Bob, so when Mallory is not performing any attack, Bob can
send to both Alice and Mallory at 11 Mbps. That is, if Alice and Mallory
started User Datagram Protocol (UDP) downloads, they would each receive
approximately half of the available bandwidth.
Consider the particular rate adaptation algorithm implemented on a Linksys
WRT54G access point. Initially, Bob’s rate adaptation chooses 11 Mbps for
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its first three transmissions and 2 Mbps for its last four retransmissions.
If Mallory acknowledges after the third transmission, Bob determines that
11 Mbps is too high an initial rate, and will send the subsequent packet at
5.5 Mbps for the first three transmissions and 1 Mbps for the next four re-
transmissions. If Mallory again acknowledges after the third transmission,
Bob determines that 5.5 Mbps is again too high an initial rate, and will send
the subsequent packet at 2 Mbps for the first three transmissions and 1 Mbps
for the next four retransmissions. If Mallory again acknowledges after the
third transmission, Bob will determine that 2 Mbps is still too high and will
send all subsequent packets at 1 Mbps.
If Mallory performs the partial deafness attack, and she does not acknowl-
edge receiving a packet until the seventh transmission, Bob would send pack-
ets to Mallory at 1 Mbps in the steady state, but to Alice at 11 Mbps. Thus,
it would take Bob 11 times longer to send an identical packet to Mallory
than to Alice. In other words, if Bob sends an equal number of packets to
Alice and Mallory, without considering retransmission, Mallory is already
allocated 11
12
= 91.7% of the channel occupancy time as opposed to 50% in a
time-fair scheme.
Now consider the additional effect of retransmissions. In the direct se-
quence spread spectrum (DSSS) mode of 802.11b, the slot time is 20µs, and
the minimum and maximum contention window (CW) sizes are 31 and 1023,
respectively. Typically 802.11 networks are configured to allow a maximum
transmission unit of around 2304 bytes. In 802.11, a station can fragment
larger packets into smaller fragments and transmit each fragment separately.
In this case, Mallory allows Bob to send each fragment the maximum number
of times before Bob gives up on the fragment. Thus each fragment of the
packet is transmitted seven times, which is nearly equivalent to transmit-
ting the entire packet seven times. (There are minor differences because of
the interframe spacing used between fragments; but seven retransmissions of
one large frame should closely approximate seven retransmissions of each of
several smaller fragments.)
Now let us quantify Mallory’s per-packet channel occupancy time in steady-
state. Let us assume that every time the sender (in this case Bob) wishes
to send a packet, the medium is busy, so the first transmission experiences
backoff. Further assume that once the medium becomes idle, there are no
further transmissions on that medium except those initiated by Bob. I vali-
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date the theoretical results here with implementation results in Section 3.4.1,
which show that these assumptions provide results comparable to those seen
in normal access point behaviors. I consider a single UDP packet contain-
ing 1470 bytes of data, which, after UDP- and Internet Protocol (IP)-layer
headers, comes to 1498 bytes. The addition of MAC-layer headers brings the
total to 1534 bytes.
If Alice and Mallory both acknowledge reception of a packet by the third
transmission, the steady-state data rate is 11 Mbps. In this case, the first
transmission takes about 1571.6 µs in expectation: 50 µs for DIFS, 310 µs
of expected backoff, 96 µs of preamble, and 1115.6 µs of data. Bob would
expect an acknowledgment within 126 µs, which represents the sum of the
SIFS that Mallory must wait following reception, the maximum propagation
delay between Mallory and Bob, which is defined in 802.11 to be one slot time,
and the delay that 802.11 allows between when the radio frequency energy
starts impinging on the receiver until that receiver starts receiving a message,
which is defined to be the length of the preamble. In expectation, a failed
first transmission would therefore be detected 1697.6 µs after the medium
becomes idle. When the first transmission is successful, Mallory waits SIFS
and transmits a preamble and a 12 byte acknowledgment at 2 Mbps, which
gives an expected time of 1725.6 µs from when the medium is idle until the
transmission is received. (We assume the propagation time is negligible; the
20 µs slot time of 802.11 is sufficient for a 6 km transmission, which is well in
excess of typical 802.11 transmission distances.) In further retransmissions,
the one thing that changes is the expected backoff value, which increases from
310 µs to 630 µs to 1270 µs within these first three retransmissions. Also,
Bob will not wait DIFS when Bob does not receive an acknowledgment. Thus
success after three retransmissions takes 1697.6 + (1647.6 + 320) + (1675.6 +
320 + 640) = 6300.8 µs. If Mallory forces three retransmissions for each
packet while Alice acknowledges every first transmission, then Mallory will
capture 6300.8
6300.8+1725.6
= 78.5% of the channel occupancy time.
When Bob must regularly transmit each packet at least four times in or-
der to reach Mallory, Bob sends every packet to Mallory at 1 Mbps. Thus
each data transmission takes 12272 µs for data alone, which, after adding
backoff, preamble, and header for the first transmission, takes 12678 µs. The
acknowledgment times out after the same 126 µs, giving a failure time for
the first transmission of 12804 µs. Thereafter, each failure takes the same
42
amount of time after adjustment for backoff, and when the acknowledgment
finally comes, it is transmitted at 1 Mbps, so seven retransmissions takes
50 + 12678 ∗ 7 + 126 ∗ 6 + backoff increases + 202 (µs), where 50 µs is DIFS,
12678 µs is the time that each packet transmission takes, 126 µs is the time
to detect that an acknowledgment is not forthcoming, and 202 µs is the time
to finish receiving an acknowledgment. The total additional backoff for seven
retransmissions is 28160 µs in expectation, so the total transmission time is
117914 µs. If Mallory forces six retransmissions (for a total of seven trans-
missions) for each packet while Alice acknowledges every first transmission,
then Mallory will capture 117914
117914+1725.6
= 98.6% of the channel occupancy
time.
Finally, the rate diversification exacerbates the partial deafness attack. In
the same scenario, when Alice uses a 54 Mbps link in a 802.11b/g network,
Mallory’s transmissions take the same amount of time, but Alice’s trans-
missions are now much faster. The DIFS and backoff take 360 µs as before
(because it is a mixed-mode 802.11b/g access point), 802.11g does not re-
quire a preamble, and Alice’s data transmission is now 227.3 µs, for a forward
transmission time of 587.3 µs; after a 10 µs 802.11g SIFS and a 30 µs 802.11g
acknowledgment, each of Alice’s packets take 627.3 µs in expectation. Thus
Alice’s channel occupancy time drops further to 0.53%.
3.4 Implementation and Evaluation of the Attack
3.4.1 Implementation
In this section, I detail one implementation of a partial deafness attacker and
observe the effect of the attack on an 802.11 network. My implementation
uses commercial off-the-shelf 802.11 Network Interface Cards (NICs). Most
commodity 802.11 NICs generate and send acknowledgment frames automat-
ically in firmware whenever a packet is received, because of the hard real-time
deadlines on generating acknowledgments. The partial deafness attack can
then be implemented by building custom hardware, modifying the firmware
to defer acknowledgments, or turning off the network interface card any time
between the start and completion of packet reception.
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In order to simplify the task of deferring packet acknowledgments, I choose
to modify the MadWifi driver, which is a Linux kernel device driver for
Atheros-based WLAN devices. The Atheros chipset does not load a firmware
onto the card, but instead relies on a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
module that is part of the driver. The HAL module defines the interface
between the hardware and other software in the device driver to manage
many of the chip-specific operations and to enforce any relevant regulations.
The normal operation of the Atheros card is illustrated in Figure 3.2(a).
My implementation modifies MadWifi to control a particular register in the
HAL module, which in turn, enables and disables packet acknowledgments.
The modified behavior of the Atheros card is illustrated in Figure 3.2(b).
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, we suppressed acknowledgements from the first
n− 1th transmissions by switching the HAL register.
To evaluate the effectiveness of a partial deafness attacker, I consider
an evaluation network consisting of a traffic source connected to an IEEE
802.11b/g access point. A normal user and an attacker use 802.11 to connect
to the access point. This topology is illustrated in Figure 3.3. To evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the attacker, I use commercial off-the-shelf access
points such as Linksys WRT54G, which uses the Broadcom BCM5352EKPB
chipset and supports 802.11b/g mixed mode, because it shows how the rate
adaption is practically implemented in a real 802.11 system. The experiment
uses MadWifi and configures the Atheros NIC to operate in 802.11 master
mode. The experiment then uses kernel-level bridging to bridge between the
802.11 network interface card and the Ethernet network interface card. A
traffic source generates traffic as an iperf client, which was then sunk at iperf
servers running on the normal user and the attacker. An additional machine
(not shown in Figure 3.3) collects data by capturing all 802.11 frames sent
on the network.
3.4.2 Evaluation of the Partial Deafness Attack
Maximum Throughput of Attacker In order to determine an attacker’s
minimum bit rate that can saturate the channel, I first examine the maximum
throughput of the attacker using 802.11b when the attacker is the only user
of the access point. These measurements and theoretical analysis use UDP
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(a) Normal operation of an Atheros NIC
(b) Modified operation of an Atheros NIC
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Atheros NIC operation. Events happen from left
to right.
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Table 3.2: Maximum UDP throughput of an attacker. n is the number of
transmissions required before the attacker sends an acknowledgment; this
table shows results in a theoretical analysis as described in Section 3.3 and
an actual outdoor/indoor experiment without/with any detectable 802.11
interference.
n Theoretical Outdoor Indoor
1 6814.9 (kbps) 6049.0 (kbps) 5782.0 (kbps)
2 3184.2 (kbps) N/A N/A
3 1866.4 (kbps) 1563.0 (kbps) 1282.0 (kbps)
4 214.4 (kbps) 209.1 (kbps) 193.3 (kbps)
5 162.3 (kbps) 163.2 (kbps) 159.4 (kbps)
6 123.5 (kbps) 128.8 (kbps) 123.2 (kbps)
7 99.7 (kbps) 115.0 (kbps) 114.0 (kbps)
flow because UDP is a non-conforming load and will allow an attacker to
set the load regardless of the route’s capability to handle that load. When
Mallory forces Bob to transmit each packet n times, I compute the amount
of time required per packet as described in Section 3.3; I then translate it
into an application-layer rate and present it in Table 3.2.
As described in Section 3.3, the rate adaptation mechanism at the access
point selects an 11 Mbps rate for users that acknowledge at least once every
three transmissions and selects a 1 Mbps rate for users that acknowledge
less frequently than every three transmissions. This contributes to the sharp
reduction in maximum throughput between a user who acknowledges every
three packets and a user who acknowledges every four packets.
I then implement a partial deafness attacker that requires n ≤ 7 trans-
missions before it sends an acknowledgment. The driver that enables and
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Table 3.3: UDP throughputs under partial deafness attack. Attacker’s
source rate is 200 kbps. Results are averaged over 20 runs.
Normal user’s source rate Normal user’s throughput Attacker’s throughput
100 (kbps) 55.7 (kbps) 112.0 (kbps)
200 (kbps) 111.8 (kbps) 111.7 (kbps)
400 (kbps) 219.1 (kbps) 109.3 (kbps)
disables acknowledgments could not consistently set the register within the
real-time requirement between the first and the second transmissions; thus
my experiment does not test the case when n = 2. The experiment ran this
attacker both in an outdoor environment without measurable 802.11 interfer-
ence and in an indoor environment where the 802.11 interference was uncon-
trolled. Some experimental results are greater than the calculated theoretical
values because the access point, in violation of the specification, interleaves
a beacon transmission between retransmissions of the original data packet.
Because beacons are broadcast, and because broadcast messages are always
considered successful, the access point resets the contention window size to
minimum without resetting the retry count. My results show that a partial
deafness attacker receiving about 115 kbps of traffic can exhaust the entire
forwarding capability of an access point.
Impact on UDP Victim I then consider the impact on the throughput of
a normal client that uses UDP against a partial deafness attacker that only
acknowledges the seventh transmission of each packet. Theoretically, if the
access point receives α packets destined to the normal user for every packet
destined to the attacker, then we expect that the normal user would get a
α
1+α
share of the overall throughput, since the access point treats all packets
equally.
To test this hypothesis, the attacker downloads at a UDP source rate
of 200 kbps, which is sufficient to saturate the access point’s wireless link
under the partial deafness attack; and the normal user downloads at a UDP
source rate of 100, 200, then 400 kbps. The resulting throughput is shown
in Table 3.3. As expected, the ratio of throughputs is equal to the ratio of
the UDP source rates.
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Impact on TCP Victim I then consider a normal TCP user competing for
bandwidth against a partial deafness attacker. The attacker again downloads
at a UDP source rate of 200 kbps. To show the impact of the attack, I allow
the TCP flow to warm up for a period of time before the attack starts; I
then perform the attack for a period of time, and finally turn off the attack
and allow TCP to return to its steady-state behavior. I measure the MAC-
layer bandwidth usage to study how nodes share the available bandwidth on
the wireless link. The MAC-layer measurement counts each retransmission
as additional channel use. As shown previously, each transmission to the
attacker theoretically takes around 118 ms. I thus quantize each protocol’s
usage into 500 ms slots so that the normal user has a chance to receive data
in each slot, and each slot conveys the granularity of MAC-layer usage. I
plot the MAC-layer usage over time for each scenario. Because the TCP flow
has a warm-up and cool-down period where the attacker does not perform
the partial deafness attack, each plot includes a shaded box covering the
30-second time interval (from 0 to 30) during which the attack took place.
Figure 3.4(a) shows the MAC-layer usage when a partial deafness attacker
competes against a normal user’s TCP flow when both clients use 802.11b.
As shown in Table 3.2, a UDP attacker only needs to transmit 115 kbps
in order to saturate the link and cause congestion; allowing the attacker to
send 200 kbps traffic would cause the attacker to experience a 43% loss rate
without considering a sharing normal user. When a normal TCP user shares
the channel with the attacker, the access point treats and drops an equal
fraction of UDP and TCP packets; hence the TCP user would experience
a similar loss rate as the attacker. That is, the normal TCP user would
experience at least a 43% loss rate; since TCP is a conforming transport layer
protocol, such a high loss rate causes repeated TCP time-out and results in
minuscule throughput for the normal user, as shown in Figure 3.4(a).
I then examine the impact of a partial deafness attacker in the scenario
where a normal user connects to the access point using the 802.11g standard.
The normal user enjoys a faster connection when the attacker is silent; how-
ever, when the attacker carries out the partial deafness attack, the transfer
speed of the normal 802.11g user is not significantly faster than that of a
normal 802.11b user, as illustrated in Figure 3.4(b). This result is consis-
tent with our analysis of rate diversity in a 802.11b/g network at the end of
Section 3.3.
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Figure 3.4: MAC-layer utilization by TCP under the partial deafness
attack. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack; results are
averaged over 20 runs, with the error bars showing 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.5: Ns-2 simulation of the partial deafness attack on a network with
multiple 802.11b normal users and an UDP attacker. Results are averaged
over 20 runs, with the error bars showing 95% confidence interval.
The partial deafness attack creates head-of-queue blocking by using re-
transmission and rate diversity; thus, a normal user will experience an even
higher loss rate when other normal users are also present. This is intuitive
since all users are going to compete for the limited amount of remaining
bandwidth.
I also perform an ns-2 simulation on the impact of the partial deafness
attack in a network with 1 to 10 normal users in addition to the attacker.
In the simulation, all users (normal and attacker) are located on a circle
1 m away from the access point. The normal users and the attacker are
given identical properties (such as signal and noise power levels), except
the acknowledgment policy. That is, the attacker is identical to a normal
user except he does not acknowledge receiving a packet until the seventh
transmission. Figure 3.5 shows the effectiveness of the partial deafness attack
when the attacker uses UDP with source rate of 200 kbps. The goodput per
normal user during attack is minuscule compared to the fair goodput each
normal user enjoys without the attack.
I examine the effectiveness of the partial deafness attack on two other ac-
cess points that use different chipsets from that of Linksys WRT54G. Specifi-
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cally, I examine a Linksys WRT54GC, and a Trendnet TEW-432BRP access
points. Figure 3.6 shows the result, and both access points are also suscepti-
ble to the partial deafness attack. Even though rate adaptation mechanisms
of these two access points are different from that of Linksys WRT54G, the
partial deafness attack still makes the attacker’s traffic use the base rate dur-
ing attack period. For the Linksys WRT54GC, each packet is retransmitted
only four times. The rate adaptation mechanism in Trendnet TEW-432BRP
decreases the rate slowly as compared to the Linksys WRT54G. This differ-
ence results in slower performance degradation, as shown in Figure 3.6(b).
3.5 Countermeasure
In this section, I propose a countermeasure that mitigates the partial deaf-
ness attack. The partial deafness attack is based on head-of-queue blocking
at the access point that results in starvation of normal users. Thus I propose
mitigating the attack by instead enforcing time fairness to prevent starva-
tion. Time fairness has also been suggested in previous work [32] to increase
throughput in a network with rate diversity.
Time fairness can be enforced at the access point by implementing a Time-
Based Regulator (TBR) that times each transmission: if user A is allocated
time duration tn in the n
th round, then all other users are allocated the same
time duration.
To implement a TBR, I use HostAP on a Pentium-III 1 GHz laptop running
Linux 2.6.24 so as to gain control of the queuing behavior. The Pentium-
III laptop has an Ethernet interface and an Atheros 802.11a/b/g card. In
particular, I implement a priority queue at the access point in order to select
the next client to serve. I also emulate the rate adaptation algorithm of the
Linksys WRT54G access point in order to obtain consistent comparisons of
the data rates between the attack scenarios and the implemented mitigation.
I first consider the case where a normal UDP user shares the wireless link
with a partial deafness attacker. Both the partial deafness attacker and
the normal user have a UDP source rate of 11 Mbps. The partial deafness
attacker is configured to only acknowledge the seventh transmission of every
packet. The resulting throughput is shown in Table 3.4. When there is no
attacker, the user can receive 6.07 Mbps of traffic, which is consistent with
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Figure 3.6: MAC-layer utilization by TCP under the partial deafness
attack. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack.
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Table 3.4: UDP throughput of normal user and partial deafness attacker
with Time-Based Regulator (TBR). The source rate of attacker and normal
user is 11 Mbps. Results are averaged over 20 runs.
Attacker Normal user
Normal user only 6.07 (Mbps)
Without TBR 110.9 (kbps) 107.9 (kbps)
With TBR 52.5 (kbps) 2.93 (Mbps)
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Figure 3.7: The TCP user’s MAC-layer channel utilization with the
countermeasures. The shaded region (0-30 sec) shows the time of attack;
results are averaged over 20 runs, with the error bars (95% confidence
interval).
the previous result in Table 3.2. Moreover, when the attacker is present,
the user still enjoys almost half of this rate, at 2.93 Mbps, which shows a
significant improvement over using access opportunity fairness.
I apply a TBR to a TCP user in the presence of a partial deafness attacker
who uses UDP at the transport layer. Figure 3.7 shows that a TBR allows
the normal user to obtain significantly better service when under attack. In
particular, the normal TCP user ceases to experience heavy packet losses
when a TBR is deployed at the access point.
Time fairness can be implemented with 802.11e by choosing an appropri-
ate traffic category for each node according to their fair share of channel
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occupancy time [32]. However, 802.11e itself (i.e. 802.11e without TBR)
might not be effective as a countermeasure since 802.11e specifies only four
traffic categories (i.e. four queues). As multiple partial deafness attackers
can connect to a single access point, the attackers can collectively block all
four queues used by 802.11e.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I present the partial deafness attack that exploits the fair-
ness mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 standard. My attack targets the 802.11
MAC protocol without modifying the MAC-layer implementation. Further-
more, the partial deafness attack does not require the attacker to have better
resources than a normal user; the attacker can have lower signal strength,
slower computation, and be farther from the base station and still negatively
impact the normal users. In particular, the partial deafness attack uses low
bit rate and retransmission, two mechanisms that do not affect fair access-
opportunity, but creates head-of-queue blocking at the access point.
I show that the partial deafness attack substantially degrades the perfor-
mance of normal users that use UDP and can almost completely deny service
to users using TCP. I then propose and evaluate a time-fair countermeasure
that mitigates the partial deafness attack using a time-based regulator. We
experimentally show that the countermeasure restores a reasonable level of
performance for normal users.
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CHAPTER 4
CRAFT: A SECURE TRANSPORT LAYER
CONGESTION CONTROL PROTOCOL
A link is a communication channel connecting two or more communicating
end hosts. A pair of end hosts are connected if between them there exists
a path consisting of one or more links. For example, a wireless medium
is a link that allows multiple nearby wireless devices to connect to each
other; and two non-neighboring end hosts sharing a common neighbor can
be connected using a two-link path via the common neighbor. The link with
the minimum communication bandwidth on the path between two end hosts
is the bottleneck link, and the communication throughput between the two
end hosts is determined by the bandwidth of the bottleneck link.
In an ad hoc network, any link in the network is a potential bottleneck
link since all links are established between end hosts. In a network with in-
frastructure, however, some links might not be bottleneck links since benign
access points only generate negligible traffic compared to end hosts. More-
over, it is commonly assumed that the core of today’s Internet infrastructure
is over-provisioned and all bottleneck links are topologically close to the end
hosts.
If an end host directs to a second end host a large number of data packets,
the packets may occupy an unfair amount of bandwidth. In the extreme case,
the number of data packets is so large that the packets exhaust all available
bandwidth of the bottleneck link between the two end hosts. Any other end
hosts sharing the bottleneck link will no longer be able to use it. This type
of denial-of-service is known as flooding.
Flooding can be both the result of a flash event or a malicious act. In
this chapter, I do not try to make a distinction between these two cases. My
approach in providing availability is to use fairness enforcement to defend
against flooding: We enforce that all end hosts fairly share the communica-
tion medium, so that even if a link is congested, all end hosts sharing that
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link suffer fairly. We adopt this approach to avoid the undesirable scenario
of mistaking a flash crowd as malicious denial-of-service attackers.
4.1 TCP Fairness and TCP Congestion Control
As seen from Chapter 3, we must be careful in selecting the fairness metric in
order to prevent malicious exploitation. A common fairness notion is “max-
min fairness,” where the ratio between the maximum and the minimum of a
set of values is minimized; a more obscure fairness notion is the “contested
garment fairness” that is analyzed in detail by Aumann and Maschler [33].
In designing CRAFT, which stands for Capability-based Regulation of All
Flows and Traffic, I choose to offer fairness defined by the predominant con-
gestion control protocol today: the Transport-Control-Protocol (TCP) fair-
ness. Specifically, I choose TCP congestion control as an Internet-fair rate
selection algorithm in order to maintain compatibility with legacy TCP traf-
fic.
I briefly introduce the TCP congestion control in order to demonstrate how
CRAFT enables each deploying router to enforce that each flow traversing
that router follows the TCP congestion control, and in turn to enforce that
each flow obtains its TCP-fair bandwidth. In a nutshell, TCP congestion
control treats the network as a black box, observing the end-to-end delay and
loss characteristics and choosing a bit rate compatible with all intermediate
links.
TCP provides a reliable stream service, meaning that each byte sent by
the sender-side application is received intact and in-order at the receiver-side
application. Because the underlying IP network is unreliable and may reorder
packets, TCP must retransmit and reorder packets as necessary. To this
end, for each direction of a TCP connection, each byte is given a contiguous
sequence number. Each packet contains the sequence number of the first
byte contained in that packet, as well as an acknowledgement number, which
represents the sequence number of the last contiguously received byte for the
opposite-direction traffic.
The main goal of the TCP congestion control is to estimate the available
network bandwidth and adjust the offered load accordingly. The intuition
of TCP congestion control is that the sender increases the offered load un-
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til it determines (usually through packet loss) that an intermediate link is
congested, at which point it reduces the offered load. A TCP sender adjusts
its offered load by changing its congestion window (cwnd), which represents
the maximum number of unacknowledged data bytes that the sender releases
into the network at a time.
When a TCP sender initially establishes a connection with a TCP re-
ceiver, the congestion window is set to the initial window size (usually two
maximum packet sizes), ensuring that the TCP sender starts sending at a
low rate. In normal operation, the TCP receiver sends an acknowledgment
packet for every other data packet sent by the receiver. Each time the sender
gets a new acknowledgment number from the receiver, the sender increases
the size of its congestion window, allowing the sender to send more data per
round trip time, thereby increasing its data rate. The sender uses one of
two algorithms to determine the amount by which to increase the congestion
window, the selection of which depends on a parameter called the slow-start
threshold (ssthresh). The initial value of the slow-start threshold is arbitrary,
but changes as the flow experiences congestion. When the congestion window
is smaller than the slow-start threshold, the sender uses the slow-start algo-
rithm, which increases the congestion window size exponentially over time.
Once the congestion window exceeds the slow-start threshold, the sender uses
the congestion avoidance algorithm, which increases the congestion window
size linearly over time.
A sender uses packet loss as a proxy for estimating congestion. A sender
can detect packet loss in two ways. One is using the fast-retransmission
mechanism, and another is to timeout when no new acknowledgment numbers
arrive for a period of time.
In fast-retransmission, the receiver reacts to an early out-of-order packet
(that is, one with sequence number greater than the next contiguous se-
quence number) by sending an acknowledgment which will have the same
acknowledgment number as the previous acknowledgment packet, known as
a duplicate acknowledgment (dup-ack). When the sender receives a third
duplicate acknowledgment, it considers the following packet to have been
lost, and transmits that packet in a process known as fast-retransmit. Once
this packet is acknowledged, the sender performs fast-recovery by halving the
size of its congestion window, and setting the slow-start threshold to the new
congestion window, thus entering congestion avoidance.
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When a sender receives no new acknowledgement for a time exceeding the
timeout limit, the sender’s congestion control algorithm declares a timeout,
reducing the size of the congestion window to one full-sized segment and
halves the slow-start threshold. We define the rate equaling two full-sized
segments every timeout limit as the TCP timeout rate, which indicates the
minimum rate an end host can inject data into the network under heavy
congestion and packet losses when using the TCP congestion control.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, I overview prior work on the area of reactive DoS counter-
measures, capability-based systems, and bandwidth management schemes.
Reactive Countermeasures Reactive countermeasures only react when
the network determines that it is under attack. Networks can use anomaly
detection mechanisms [34, 35, 36] to detect attacks. After detecting an at-
tack, a defense system can use traceback mechanisms [37, 38] to reconstruct
network paths to the source of attack traffic and subsequently react to traf-
fic from such source. In particular, pushback [39, 40] mechanisms provide a
way to rate-limit attack traffic. These reactive defense mechanisms have two
fundamental problems. First, they need to solve a difficult inference problem
to detect an attack before they can react to the attack, and could potentially
result in false positives. Second, if the time taken to react and limit the
attack traffic is long, the resulting damage can be severe before the system
can mitigate the attack.
Filter-Based Systems Filter-based systems partition incoming flows into
attack and non-attack flows, and install filters close to the source to block
attack flows [41, 42]. When filtering is performed at the end host, filter-based
systems cannot stop colluding attackers from flooding a link, because attack-
ing flows never terminate at a legitimate host. Filtering at an intermediate
host other than the end-host deprives the filter of application-specific infor-
mation available only at the end host. Furthermore, filters are unlikely to
catch all misbehaving flows, so some mechanism to ensure fairness among un-
filtered flows may still be necessary. I therefore consider filter-based systems
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to be orthogonal to my approach, which is an improvement on capability-
based fairness-enforcing systems.
Capability-Based Systems Capability-based systems proactively prevent
attacks from happening instead of mitigating the attacks after the fact. An-
derson et al. suggest the application of capability to defend bandwidth ex-
haustion attacks [43]. Yaar et al. propose the SIFF algorithm [44], and
Yang et al. propose the TVA algorithm [45] that are concrete designs of
capability-based DoS defense systems. Liu et al. compared the performance
of various capability-based systems and filter-based systems [42].
A common problem in capability-based systems is the denial-of-capability
attack, where an attacker floods a link with connection initialization packets
with the intent of exhausting the capability request channel. In previous
literature, Parno et al. propose the Portcullis algorithm to defend against
this attack [46] by prioritizing service requests based on the computational
power used to generate them. The request channel exhaustion attack is
orthogonal to the CRAFT protocol, and CRAFT uses Portcullis to prevent
the denial-of-capability attack.
Previously proposed capability-based protocols could provide incremental-
deployment properties if the congestion point could be determined in ad-
vance, and if the autonomous system controlling that point deployed the
capability system; Yang et al. first suggested this technique [45]. My work
can be seen as the first capability-based system that can be incrementally
deployed securely without assuming the knowledge of the congestion point,
and in fact without necessarily requiring deployment in every autonomous
system.
Bandwidth Management Schemes Fair bandwidth allocation has been
studied in depth. Stoica et al. propose a core-stateless fair queuing (CSFQ)
algorithm to reduce flow state in core routers [47]. In their proposed CSFQ
algorithm, only edge routers perform flow-specific operations. CRAFT can
also be used to provide the core-stateless property of CSFQ; moreover, since
CRAFT can protect all downstream links, CRAFT can allocate a TCP-fair
rate without any help from core routers, unlike CSFQ, in which core routers
must process a special CSFQ header. That is, CRAFT can provide CSFQ
at a lower cost in the core at the expense of higher costs at the edges.
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TCP trunking systems provide aggregated flow fairness. Kung et al. pro-
pose a TCP trunking algorithm that emulates the TCP congestion control
mechanism; however, this emulation is intended to provide fair rates for the
aggregate of flows between edge routers [48], not to provide fair rates for in-
dividual flows. CRAFT provides better granularity; each link is shared fairly
by all flows traversing it. While the trunking mechanism can only guarantee
fair sharing in links between two deployed routers, a single CRAFT router
can securely guarantee fair sharing on all downstream links.
4.3 CRAFT Design
In this section I present the details of CRAFT and how a CRAFT router
provides TCP-fairness for all its downstream links by preventing a CRAFT
sender from exhausting the bandwidth of any downstream links. In partic-
ular, I explain in detail how CRAFT reacts to packet reordering and loss.
For simplicity, I present my proposed protocol as it would operate when
data flows in only one direction, even though the CRAFT protocol design,
simulation, and implementation extend to bidirectional flows.
4.3.1 CRAFT High-Level Design
CRAFT ensures that all flows adhere to the TCP congestion control speci-
fication by emulating the state of each flow at each CRAFT router. If each
packet belonging to a particular flow traverses a CRAFT router, the CRAFT
router can calculate the maximum allowable size of the congestion window
(cwnd) by using the standardized congestion control specifications [49].
Since flows may follow asymmetric routes [50], a single router might not
capture both a packet and its acknowledgment. Furthermore, acknowledg-
ments in TCP are not cryptographically dependent on the data in the TCP
packet, allowing a receiver to send acknowledgments without actually re-
ceiving a packet [51]. A CRAFT router thus controls each CRAFT flow by
verifying that a secure token was issued and subsequently received in the
following rounds by itself. In other words, a CRAFT router can monitor a
flow as long as the path of that flow remains the same.
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Figure 4.1: Capability-based enforcement of TCP congestion control
algorithm. The CRAFT router generates a pre-capability for a flow. After
the receiver gets the pre-capability, the receiver calculates and forwards a
new capability to the sender. The sender includes received capability to the
CRAFT router in a future packet. By verifying the capability, the CRAFT
router can know that the previous data packet and acknowledgment were
successfully received by the receiver and sender, respectively.
To allow each CRAFT router to monitor the remaining path of the flow
from the router to the receiver, a CRAFT router inserts a pseudorandom
token in each CRAFT packet routed through that router. I refer to this
token as a pre-capability. Like SYN cookies, a CRAFT router assumes pri-
vacy of plaintext traffic between routers. A CRAFT receiver combines pre-
capabilities from each of the routers into a capability for each router; each
of these capabilities is then concatenated to form a capability for the path.
A receiver that successfully received the capability issued by each router is
likely to also have received the entire packet; thus the capability associated
with each CRAFT router can prove to the issuing CRAFT router the delivery
of a packet and its acknowledgement. By requiring the sender to include the
capability with future packets, a CRAFT router can verify that the receiver
has received the previous data packet and the sender has received a legitimate
acknowledgement.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how CRAFT generates and maintains capabilities.
When a sender initiates a CRAFT flow, it sends a CRAFT request packet,
and the router allocates state in its memory corresponding to the new flow,
and includes the initial capability for that new flow in the packet. When the
flow initiation packet reaches the receiver, the receiver allocates state for the
new flow, stores the initial capability value, and sends an acknowledgement
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to the sender to finish connection establishment, including in its response the
capability corresponding to each router.
Once a sender establishes a connection, the sender allocates a unique con-
tiguous number, the Packet ID, for each packet it wishes to send. The
CRAFT Packet ID will be different from, and is somewhat uncorrelated
to, a TCP sequence number since the TCP sequence number is issued based
on the byte number, while CRAFT Packet ID is issued based on the packet
number. To prove to a CRAFT router that the sender has indeed received
an acknowledgement, the sender also includes the most recent capability it
has received from the receiver. The router first checks to see if this router
has previously seen this packet ID for this flow, for example by using a data
structure similar to the one IPSec uses for duplicate detection [52]. If the
Packet ID is a duplicate, the packet is discarded; otherwise the router checks
to see if the most recent capability reflects a new acknowledgement; if so,
it processes the acknowledgement as described in Section 4.3.4 and updates
the cwnd as described in Section 4.3.5. The CRAFT router then determines
whether or not this packet can be sent using the current cwnd; if not, it
drops the packet. Otherwise, it replaces the valid capability (which is now
no longer needed) with a new pre-capability specific to the Packet ID of this
packet and forwards the packet to the next hop.
When the receiver receives a CRAFT packet, the receiver performs a bit-
wise exclusive-or between the newly received pre-capability Pf,i (the pre-
capability for Packet ID i in flow f) and the previously stored capability
Cf,i−1 (the capability for Packet ID i − 1 in flow f) and stores the result of
this operation in the new capability, so Cf,i = Cf,i−1⊕Pf,i. The receiver then
returns this new capability to the source for use in future packets.
4.3.2 CRAFT Packet Header
In this section, I outline the format of the CRAFT packet header used in
the prototype implementation. The header is illustrated in Figure 4.2. This
represents one set of design choices, which may not be optimal, but serves to
illustrate the data needed in a CRAFT packet header.
In the simulations, CRAFT packets are assigned a specific IP protocol
number. When a CRAFT packet carries a data payload, the “Next header”
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Figure 4.2: Capability packet header format: This header is inserted
between IP header and a transport-layer protocol header.
field of the packet carries the protocol number of that data payload, as in IPv6
hop-by-hop and destination options headers. Up to two CRAFT headers can
be contained in any packet: the outer CRAFT header (immediately following
the IP header) is intended to be visible to and processed by routers along the
path, and the internal CRAFT header (following the outer CRAFT header)
is used to return capabilities and packet reception data to the receiving host.
The “Header length” field represents the number of bytes taken by this entire
CRAFT header.
The Partial ACK (PA) field is the number of optional Non-contiguous
packet IDs fields at the end of this CRAFT header; these are used to keep
track of packets that are received out-of-order. Verifying that these packets
were properly received allows a CRAFT router to determine when a sender’s
initiation of fast-retransmission is authorized.
The Capability Size (CS) field is used to select between short capabilities
and long capabilities, as described in Section 4.4.1. The timeout (TO) bit is
set when this packet is the first packet following a timeout. The next field
indicates the number of lost packets whose Packet IDs are listed in optional
fields at the end of this CRAFT header; Lost packets correspond to the
packets that would be retransmitted by TCP Congestion Control. The hop
count indicates the number of CRAFT-enforcing routers traversed since the
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packet left the source. Type indicates whether this packet is an establishment
packet or a regular data packet.
Each CRAFT packet is given a contiguous and increasing Packet ID. The
ACK ID is the Packet ID in this direction of the most recent contiguously
acknowledged packet (subject to any losses disclosed through Lost Packet
IDs). The Capability ID is the Packet ID in this direction of the most recent
acknowledged packet without any continuity requirement; this is not required
for protocol functionality but used to simplify implementation.
The Hash field is a value drawn from a hash chain, and is used to prevent
an attacker from spoofing a packet with an arbitrary Packet ID, as described
in Section 4.4.2. The sender initializes the Capability/Pre-Capability field to
the capability described in this packet header; then each intermediate router
changes its part of the capability to a pre-capability for this Packet ID, so
that at the receiver, the field contains a pre-capability corresponding to this
Packet ID.
Finally the optional fields of non-contiguous packets and lost packets are
included in the quantities specified earlier in the packet. Ordinarily the
capability is computed over exactly those pre-capabilities corresponding to
Packet IDs between 1 and the ACK ID. A non-contiguous packet ID is in-
cluded when the capability includes a pre-capability from a Packet ID larger
than the ACK ID; a Lost Packet ID is used to indicate that the capability
omits certain pre-capabilities even though their Packet ID is less than the
ACK ID. To prevent the accumulation of lost packet information, once every
router has seen a specific Lost Packet ID, it needs not be included in future
packets on this flow.
4.3.3 Pre-Capability Construction
Pre-capabilities must be constructed so that any router can efficiently verify
its previously issued pre-capabilities; otherwise the router may not be able
to handle dense traffic traversing through that router.
Pre-capabilities must also be constructed so that they are unpredictable;
that is, when a packet is lost, an attacker cannot predict the pre-capability
of that packet; otherwise the attacking receiver can acknowledge lost packets
and continue to grow its cwnd in the face of congestion.
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To provide both properties, we generate pre-capabilities using a crypto-
graphically secure hash function g:
Pf,i = g(K, f, i),
where K is the secret key of the CRAFT router, f is the flow ID, and i is
the Packet ID from the CRAFT header. In our implementation, the ID of
a flow is a large value randomly generated by the router when the flow is
created. If g is a hash function in the Random Oracle Model [53], then Pf,i
is indistinguishable from a random number because the pair (f, i) has not
been previously seen.
When a receiver receives contiguous packets, it combines the pre-capabilities
corresponding to those packets using the exclusive-or (xor) function. For the
sake of efficiency, we would like to be able to verify a large set of combined
contiguous pre-capabilities in constant time. We use a telescoping construc-
tion:
g(K, f, i) = EK(f ||i)⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1),
where EK represents a computationally efficient keyed MAC such as HMAC [54].
By choosing EK as a secure pseudo-random function, it follows that Pf,i is
also indistinguishable from a random number.
The receiver constructs the capability associated with ACK ID i by com-
puting the exclusive-or of all pre-capabilities up to i,
Cf,i = Pf,0 ⊕ . . .⊕ Pf,i.
By combining pre-capabilities at the receiver using the exclusive-or func-
tion, we take advantage of a desirable property where if any input (and
its distribution) is unknown, the output is uniformly distributed over the
domain, yielding the largest uncertainty and secrecy in the information the-
oretic sense. Moreover, since Pf,i = EK(f ||i) ⊕ EK(f ||i + 1), the capability
can be calculated efficiently using
Cf,i = EK(f ||0)⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1).
Since a capability is formed by xor’ing all pre-capabilities associated with
a (flow, router) pair, the size of a capability is the same as a pre-capability. I
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design CRAFT so that each autonomous system deploying CRAFT needs not
trust its neighboring autonomous systems; thus, each CRAFT flow should
be policed by one CRAFT router in that autonomous system. Consequently,
the overhead of CRAFT is directly related to the number of deploying au-
tonomous systems on the path multiplied by the length of each capability.
To minimize overhead, the prototype CRAFT implementation uses three-bit
“short” capabilities. The security of using short capabilities will be discussed
further in Section 4.4.1.
4.3.4 Capability Verification under Packet Loss
As long as no packets are lost, the capability when ACK ID is i can easily
be verified using Cf,i = EK(f ||0) ⊕ EK(f ||i + 1). In this section, I discuss
how the router can efficiently verify capabilities despite packet losses.
The ACK ID stores the largest contiguous packet ID that the receiver is
acknowledging, subject to disclosed packet losses. For example, if a sender
has received acknowledgments for packets 1 through i, and packet i + 1 is
lost, then the acknowledgment for packet i + 2 will reflect an ACK ID of i
and a partial acknowledgment of i+ 2. The acknowledgment for packet i+ 3
will reflect an ACK ID of i and a partial acknowledgment of {i + 2, i + 3}.
When packet i+ 4 arrives at the receiver, the receiver knows that this third
duplicate acknowledgment would trigger fast-retransmission, so it sends an
ACK ID of i+ 4 and a lost packet of i+ 1.
When the sender receives this acknowledgment for packet i + 4, it will
adjust its cwnd in accordance with TCP fast-retransmission; we will discuss
cwnd calculations in Section 4.3.5. In its subsequent packets j, j + 1, . . ., the
sender will include a lost packet field to indicate that packet i + 1 was lost.
Since Packet IDs are used sequentially, the sender does not reuse the Packet
ID i+ 1. Instead, when the sender receives an acknowledgment for a Packet
ID of at least j, it knows that each router on the path knows about the loss
of packet i+ 1, and can also stop including a lost packet field for packet i+ 1
in subsequent packets.
I now present the algorithm that CRAFT routers use to verify capabilities
in real network conditions, which can include packet losses and reorderings.
My algorithm has constant per-flow storage overhead, regardless of the num-
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ber of losses experienced by each flow. For each flow, the router keeps track
of the largest ACK ID for which a capability was correctly verified. Tem-
porarily ignoring partial acknowledgements (out-of-order acknowledgements
with Packet ID greater than ACK ID), it also keeps track of the most re-
cent capability verified in this way. For example, if ACK ID i were verified
without losses, then the router would keep track of (i, Cf,i).
When a later packet with ACK ID i+ 4 and Lost Packet ID i+ 1 arrives,
the router checks to make sure that the presented capability C equals Cf,i⊕
Pf,i+2 ⊕ Pf,i+3 ⊕ Pf,i+4; that is, the new capability is consistent with the
last valid capability xor the pre-capabilities between the last valid capability
and the current capability. More generally, if the router stores ACK ID i
and capability C, and the new packet indicates ACK ID j > i, lost packets
L = {`1, `2, . . . , `n}, and capability C ′, then C ′ is valid if and only if C ′ =
C
⊕
{x∈([i+1,j]\L)} Pf,x; that is, when we xor C with all pre-capabilities between
i + 1 and j that are not associated with a lost packet, the result should be
the new capability.1 If C ′ is valid, we update the (ACK ID, Capability) pair
to (j, C ′).
When a packet includes partial acknowledgments, the verifying router can
efficiently verify them using the property of the xor function. In particular,
if a packet has capability C and partial acknowledgment a1, a2, then, for pur-
poses of verification, it is the same as having capability C⊕Pf,a1 ⊕Pf,a2 and
no partial acknowledgments. The verifying router therefore adjusts for par-
tial acknowledgments before proceeding with the verification steps discussed
above. This also means that any stored capabilities do not include partial
acknowledgments, minimizing the necessary router state.
4.3.5 Congestion Window Calculation
When a CRAFT router verifies a new capability, it knows that one or more
additional packets have been acknowledged by the receiver, so the router up-
dates its emulated cwnd. Because the TCP protocol description leaves some
room for interpretation, a flow’s exact cwnd depends on the TCP implemen-
1Since x⊕ x = 0, the router can efficiently calculate
C
⊕
{x∈([i+1,j]\L)} Pf,x = C ⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1)⊕ EK(f ||j + 1)
⊕
x∈([i+1,j]∩L) Pf,x.
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tation. I thus only provide a reasonable bound on the cwnd according to the
standard [49].
Like a TCP sender, a CRAFT router maintains state on the cwnd, slow-
start threshold (ssthresh), and maximum segment size of each flow. The
sender discloses the maximum segment size at connection initialization, and
whenever the maximum segment size changes. The CRAFT router updates
this state in a manner consistent with the behavior of a legitimate TCP
sender-receiver pair.
The CRAFT router can distinguish between acknowledgments generated
from contiguous packets and those generated due to out-of-order delivery by
examining the ACK ID and the partial acknowledgment fields. The cwnd
and ssthresh are initialized to some predefined values suggested by the TCP
standard. In the case of contiguous packets, the CRAFT router emulates
a sender that has received one acknowledgment per packet, which is the
maximum that the TCP standard allows the receiver to send. Though a
unidirectional TCP flow uses delayed acknowledgments, i.e. sending only
one acknowledgment for every two received packets, a bidirectional TCP flow
opportunistically carries acknowledgments on new reverse traffic, allowing the
possibility of one acknowledgment per packet. Since the cwnd grows faster
in this latter case, we choose to emulate the cwnd according to one ACK per
packet in order to form a reasonable upper bound of the cwnd.
When a CRAFT router determines that acknowledgments are generated
due to out-of-order delivery, it does not adjust the cwnd until three such
duplicate acknowledgments are detected, at which point the sender must
include a Lost packet ID in the CRAFT header. The CRAFT router then
emulates the TCP state associated with fast-retransmission and fast-recovery.
Because a CRAFT router knows specifically which packets were lost and
which packets were transmitted in response to that loss, it can easily detect
fast-retransmission and emulate fast-recovery.
Specifically, when the CRAFT router sees a Lost Packet ID, the router-
emulated flow state enters fast recovery phase. The CRAFT router reduces
the ssthresh to the maximum of half of the amount of outstanding packets or
two times the sender’s maximum segment size (SMSS) and sets the emulated
cwnd to the new ssthresh plus 3 SMSS to take into consideration the three
duplicate acknowledgments. The CRAFT router considers the first packet
with disclosed packet loss as a retransmitted packet and records that packet’s
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Packet ID. When the CRAFT router sees an acknowledgment with increment
of 1 during fast recovery phase, it increases the emulated cwnd by 1 SMSS
to keep the same number of outstanding packets. When the CRAFT router
sees a packet with an ACK ID equal to or larger than the recorded ID of the
retransmission packet, the emulated state exits from fast recovery phase and
the CRAFT router sets the emulated cwnd to ssthresh.
In some circumstances, a TCP sender loses a packet and cannot recover
through the fast-retransmission mechanism. In these cases, after a certain
period of time, the sender times out. To reflect recovering from a timeout in
CRAFT, the timeout (TO) field is set to 1. A router that sees a packet with
the timeout bit set to 1 then accepts any capability borne by this packet
(to reduce the burden of listing all lost packet IDs), resets the cwnd to one
packet, and halves the ssthresh.
4.3.6 Other Details
Similarly to other proposed capability-based systems, a CRAFT router al-
locates a certain amount of bandwidth to legacy traffic depending on its
admission control policy, so that users who have not deployed CRAFT can
still have access to network service. Since users can increase their traffic rate
arbitrarily, a CRAFT router limits the bandwidth allocated to legacy traffic
by fair-queuing.
If the route used by a CRAFT flow changes, any new CRAFT router on
the path will detect that this CRAFT flow is not associated with a previously
established connection. Any such router will ignore the CRAFT header in
the packet, treat the packet as legacy traffic, and send a reset message to
the corresponding sender of such flow. The sender can then reinitiate a new
CRAFT flow to the destination.
4.4 Security Analysis of CRAFT
In this section, I discuss several possible attacks on the basic design of
CRAFT as explained in Section 4.3 and describe my proposed defense mech-
anisms.
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4.4.1 Capability Forgery Attack
A CRAFT router disregards all packets with invalid capabilities. That is, if a
flow wishes to increase its rate above the CRAFT rate, it needs to send more
capabilities than it receives. An attacker can guess future acknowledgments
by flooding the network with random capabilities. Only 1/(23) = 1/8 of
which are expected to be accepted by the first CRAFT router on the path.
If there are n deploying CRAFT routers on the path between the attacker
and the bottleneck link, then 1/(23n) = 1/(8n) of the packets are expected
to enter the bottleneck link. Since deploying CRAFT routers may be sparse
in the initial phase of deployment, there may not be enough CRAFT routers
on the path to prevent exhausting the bottleneck link bandwidth.
Therefore, when a CRAFT router receives an excessive number of incor-
rect capabilities from a particular flow, it notifies the sender to switch to
using long capabilities instead of the 3-bit short capabilities used under nor-
mal operations. We choose this approach rather than penalizing the flow to
prevent the attack where an attacker alters the capability of a packet from a
legitimate flow, thereby harming the performance of the benign flow.
When using long capabilities, such as those 32-bits long, the probability of
guessing a valid capability is vanishingly small, and an attacker that tries to
guess random capabilities will have its bandwidth reduced by a factor of 232
at each legitimate CRAFT router. To put this in perspective, an attacker
flooding an OC-768 link at line-speed can only squeeze 9.3 bps past the first
CRAFT router. Each additional CRAFT router provides a further reduction
in bandwidth. A router determines whether short or long capabilities are in
use using the Capability Size (CS) field of the CRAFT header.
4.4.2 The Spoofing Attack
A CRAFT router removes duplicate packets that share a Packet ID within
a single flow. Thus, an attacker that forges a packet with Packet ID p from
a benign flow causes the actual benign packet bearing Packet ID p to be
dropped by the CRAFT router.
I propose using a 64-bit hash chain to authenticate the Packet ID. A hash
chain consists of a series of hash values generated by a cryptographic hash
function [55]. A cryptographic hash function takes a message of arbitrary
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hN hN-1 hN-2 h0
H(r || hN) H(r || hN-1) H(r || h1)
Figure 4.3: Generation of a hash chain
length as input, and computes a fixed-length output, called a message digest.
Such a function is preimage resistant if given h = H(m), it is infeasible to
obtain m.
To generate a hash chain of length N , the sender chooses two nonces, r
and hN , and generates the chain by feeding back the output of a preimage
resistant hash function as the input. That is, hi−1 = H(r||hi), where the ||
operation denotes concatenation. Figure 4.3 illustrates the generation of a
hash chain of length N . The nonce r is included in the input to avoid reusing
a hash value of other flows.
To allow each CRAFT router to authenticate Packet IDs, a sender includes
in its CRAFT connection initiation packet the values of r and h0. Each
CRAFT router stores the values r and h0 to authenticate future hash values.
When the sender sends Packet ID m, it includes the hash value hm in the
hash field of the CRAFT header.
When a CRAFT router receives a new packet, it can authenticate the
Packet ID by traversing the hash chain. For example, when the CRAFT
router receives Packet ID 1 with hash element h′, it will verify that H(r||h′) =
h0, and if so, the CRAFT router will know that h1 = h
′. Since the cryp-
tographic hash function is preimage resistant, it is infeasible for other users
to generate hi from hi−1 in a reasonable amount of time. Thus, a CRAFT
router can mitigate the spoofing attack by authenticating Packet IDs with
minimal effort when the router decides that authentication is required.
4.4.3 Compromised Router
If a router is compromised, then it can arbitrarily drop packets traversing that
router. This problem is orthogonal to capability-based systems for preventing
bandwidth exhaustion.
The router can also collude with an endpoint, but this provides no ad-
vantage over using the router as an end point directly. For example, if the
compromised router R is on the path between malicious nodes M1 and M2, R
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can facilitate their bandwidth overuse as well as if M1 establishes a CRAFT
connection to R and M2 establishes a CRAFT connection to R, and both of
these connections are used to their full capacity.
4.4.4 Memory Exhaustion Attack
Since a CRAFT router needs to maintain some state in memory for each flow,
an attacker can attempt to exhaust the memory space of the router by estab-
lishing an excessive number of connections. CRAFT can use Portcullis [46] to
mitigate this attack by allocating a per-computation-fair share of the avail-
able number of connections among all requesting end hosts.
A CRAFT router can also dynamically adjust the difficulty of the compu-
tation puzzle as a function of its free memory. Specifically, when the memory
of a CRAFT router is mostly unused, the router uses easier computation puz-
zles to encourage more flows to use CRAFT; it otherwise uses computation
puzzles that are more difficult to mitigate any possible memory exhaustion
attack.
An attacker can also attempt to exhaust the memory space of each packet.
In each CRAFT packet header, a limited memory space is allocated for pre-
capabilities. Thus, if an attacker fills that limited memory space with fake
pre-capabilities, no CRAFT routers can monitor the flow since no CRAFT
routers can insert pre-capabilities.
A CRAFT router mitigates this attacker by assigning flows to use the
legacy portion of the link controlled by the router. When flows use 3-bit
short capabilities, the CRAFT packet header can support 16 CRAFT routers
monitoring the flow. Since we assume routers can trust other routers in the
same autonomous system, the CRAFT packet header allows a flow to traverse
16 autonomous systems. A flow that traverses a path containing more than
16 autonomous systems is not likely to have a high rate due to the length of
such a path; thus assigning such flows to compete with other legacy traffic
allows CRAFT to better serve the high-priority flows.
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4.4.5 Imperfections in TCP Feedback
Because TCP measures congestion window according to bytes acknowledged
and not the total number of bytes outstanding, and because packet sizes can
vary, an attacker could exploit these differences to temporarily overwhelm a
link protected by CRAFT. For example, after an attacker acquires a sizable
congestion window, he can send multiple 1-byte packets. Since each 1-byte
packet comes with its own IP and CRAFT header, an attacker can easily
flood the network with traffic that is magnitudes larger than allowed by his
congestion window.
In order to avoid these short-term attacks, CRAFT enforces certain prop-
erties that TCP does not require. In one approach, CRAFT can enforce
Nagle’s algorithm [56]; that is, a CRAFT router allows each flow to have
one outstanding packet that is of size less than the maximum segment size.
Enforcing Nagle’s algorithm enables a CRAFT router to prevent an attacker
from sending excessively many small-sized packets.
In a more complex but application-friendly approach, when an application
needs to send a large number of small packets, the sender notifies all routers
each time it changes the maximum segment size. When a node increases
its maximum segment size, the congestion window can remain unchanged,
because the total number of bytes that can be sent for a given congestion
window decreases as the maximum segment size increases. This is because
as the maximum segment size increases, the number of packets that can be
sent for a given congestion window decreases; thus the amount of overhead
associated with those packets also decreases.
Conversely, when decreasing the maximum segment size, the amount of
bandwidth associated with a given congestion window increases. If the sender
can decrease its maximum segment size without also decreasing its congestion
window, then the attacker can temporarily send at much greater than its fair
rate. Thus, when a flow decreases its maximum segment size, each CRAFT
router adjusts that flow’s congestion window (cwnd) to ensure that its old
maximum data-plus-header in flight is equal to its new maximum data-plus-
header in flight, by satisfying the expression
cwndold + η
cwndold
SMSSold
= cwndnew + η
cwndnew
SMSSnew
,
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where SMSS is the sender’s maximum segment size, and η is the header
length.
4.5 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of CRAFT and compare it to other DoS de-
fense mechanisms, I implement CRAFT in a Linux kernel and in a network
simulator. This section describes the experimental methodology and results.
In particular, I implement CRAFT to verify that the design is TCP-friendly,
and to analyze the overhead associated with CRAFT; moreover, I simulate
a partial deployment scenario and quantify the effectiveness of CRAFT and
other DoS defense mechanisms.
4.5.1 Experiment Methodology
The experiment testbed consists of a small network in the Coordinated Sci-
ence Laboratory (CSL) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
that is connected over the Internet to Emulab,2 a public open network
testbed, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The small access network in CSL con-
sists of two senders connected to one router, which is in turn connected to
the Internet. The receiver in Emulab is also connected to the Internet. Each
of the two senders sends TCP or UDP packets to the receiver in Emulab
over the Internet. I place the Internet between the senders and the receiver
to experience realistic cross-traffic and queuing delay. The link bandwidth
between the senders and the router is 100 Mbps, and I vary the receiver’s
access link from 10 Mbps to 100 Mbps.
I implement CRAFT between the network layers, including header in-
sertion, processing, and extraction steps at the senders, receiver, and router.
This implementation was a Linuxkernel-level implementation so I could most
efficiently handle any CRAFT header calculations.
2http://www.emulab.org
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Sender A
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The Internet Emulab
Figure 4.4: Experimental setup to evaluate whether CRAFT is
TCP-friendly
4.5.2 Fairness Measured by Implementation
The main design goal of CRAFT is to let flows share link bandwidth in a
TCP-fair manner. In this dissertation, TCP-fairness does not mean that
traffic rate of a flow under CRAFT exactly matches the rate of a normal
TCP flow, because a CRAFT router’s emulated cwnd determines not the
exact cwnd, but the upper bound of the cwnd allowed by the TCP congestion
control.
I first examine how a CRAFT UDP flow shares bandwidth with other TCP
flows. Let sender A, a group of one to five TCP senders, send packets to a
receiver using Reno TCP in Linux kernel version 2.6.20. Then let sender B,
a single UDP sender with 10 Mbps source rate, send packets using CRAFT.
That is, B generates a 10 Mbps UDP traffic, but only transmits data allowed
by CRAFT. All flows from A and B converge at a CRAFT router before
entering the Internet and are eventually delivered as shown in Figure 4.4.
In order to make a unidirectional UDP flow compatible with CRAFT, I
implement a user-level program to send CRAFT acknowledgments in the
reverse direction.
I measure the throughput of B’s CRAFT-rate flow and the aggregate
throughput of A’s TCP flows while varying the number of TCP flows shar-
ing the access link from 1 to 5. Figure 4.5 shows our results. The thin solid
line represents the bandwidth that each flow would get if all flows equally
shared the link bandwidth. The bold solid line shows the throughput of the
CRAFT flow. We observe that the CRAFT flow enjoys 20% to 55% higher
throughput than its fair share.
The difference between CRAFT-rate and fair share can be attributed to
TCP flows using delayed acknowledgments. That is, the TCP standard rec-
ommends sending one acknowledgment for every other received packet with
some timing criteria; however, CRAFT bounds the maximum TCP rate; thus
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Figure 4.5: Throughput fairness as evaluated by implementation. A single
UDP flow, controlled by CRAFT, competes against one to five legacy TCP
flows.
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CRAFT does not use delayed acknowledgments. Since CRAFT acknowledges
packet reception more often than regular TCP flows, the cwnd of a CRAFT
flow is allowed to grow faster than a regular TCP flow, but only by a fixed
amount.
4.5.3 Overhead Measured by Implementation
To enforce TCP congestion control on each flow, CRAFT incurs two types of
overhead: packet header overhead and processing overhead. Packet header
overhead decreases the amount of goodput with a given maximum segment
size, and processing overhead increases the time a router takes to forward a
packet.
Packet Header Overhead The CRAFT header takes additional space in
the packet, thus reducing the maximum amount of data sent in each packet.
The reduced goodput can be calculated theoretically as
(MSS− ηCRAFT)
MSS
× goodputoriginal,
where MSS is the maximum segment size, ηCRAFT is the size of the CRAFT
header, and goodputoriginal is the goodput of a flow without CRAFT deploy-
ment. Since the size of a CRAFT header varies due to various optional fields,
such as Non-contiguous packet ID’s and Lost packet ID’s, I do not calculate
a theoretic packet overhead, but instead determine it experimentally.
To determine the overhead, I consider a TCP sender sending traffic through
the Internet and Emulab to the receiver. We determine the overhead by
comparing the goodput of the TCP flow when CRAFT is in use to that of
a normal TCP flow. I vary the access link bandwidth between 10 Mbps
and 100 Mbps, and perform five runs for every data point. One set of data
points reflects legacy TCP in a vanilla Linux kernel, and one set of data
points reflects the performance of TCP with CRAFT. When measuring the
goodput, I subtract the CRAFT header from the packet size in order to
determine the goodput of the TCP data and headers. Figure 4.6 shows the
mean TCP goodput for each access link rate and the 95% confidence intervals
of the average. These results show that the legacy TCP flow provides 2.03%
to 15.33% higher goodput than that of CRAFT.
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Figure 4.6: CRAFT overhead results
When the access link bandwidth is under 60 Mbps, the difference between
the goodputs of the two flows is not significant. The biggest difference be-
tween goodputs is observed when access link bandwidth equals 90 Mbps.
The goodputs of both CRAFT and normal TCP level off when the access
link bandwidth is between 60 to 90 Mbps. We believe that the reduction in
bandwidth is caused by traffic shaping somewhere outside of the experiment
control and is irrelevant to the CRAFT overhead.
Processing Overhead Upon receiving a CRAFT packet, a CRAFT router
performs several operations: looking up the flow, checking the validity of the
hash, verifying the capability, updating the congestion window, and gen-
erating a new pre-capability. I implement these functions and emulated a
CRAFT router using one core of a 3 GHz Xeon processor. I use SHA256
to generate and verify the hash chain, and RC5 to generate pre-capabilities.
Table 4.1 shows the measured processing times for each functional block.
My results show that a single core of a Xeon processor can handle over
300,000 packets per second. At a minimum packet size of a 20 byte IP
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Table 4.1: Processing times for router functions
Function Processing time
Creation of a new flow 3120 ns
Lookup of flow 30 ns
Calculation of hash 1720 ns
Verification of capability 300 ns
Update of cwnd 170 ns
Calculation of pre-capability 610 ns
header and 28 byte CRAFT header, this represents a bandwidth exceeding
14.4 Mbps. At a more realistic packet size of 1500 bytes, this represents
450 Mbps. Thus low-bandwidth routers can use a slow processor since the
processing requirement is low, and a high-bandwidth router can implement
these functions to process even more quickly on a FPGA or ASIC, easily
obtaining better performance than the Xeon CPU. These numbers are for
our particular implementation of CRAFT, and might be improved in future
implementations, so they serve as a lower bound for CRAFT performance.
4.5.4 Simulation Methodology
To evaluate the effectiveness of CRAFT in providing fairness, I measure
the effect of a DoS attack in a network with only partial deployment. Al-
though the implementation shows that a CRAFT-controlled flow competes
fairly with legacy flows, the best way to understand the differences between
CRAFT and other previously proposed capability-based DoS defense schemes
is to launch a DoS attack. I choose to implement this attack through simu-
lation. I use the ns-2 simulator3 and construct a network topology that re-
flects the topological properties of the Internet. I compare the performance
between SIFF [44], TVA [45], and CRAFT. I do not consider filter-based
systems [41, 42] and the denial-of-capability defense system, Portcullis [46],
since they are orthogonal to CRAFT. To simulate the performance of SIFF
and TVA, I use the simulation package published by the authors of StopIt [42]
and TVA [45].
There is no standard methodology for evaluating DoS defense mecha-
nisms. I thus follow the intended methodology used in the recent work of
3http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns
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Liu et al. [42]. My intended simulation scenario includes 1,000 to 10,000,000
compromised hosts sending traffic at the rate of 10 kbps each. All traffic
traverses a bottleneck link that has a 1 Gbps capacity. Due to memory con-
straints, I adopt a 1/200 scale in the simulation while maintaining the ratio
between the aggregate attack traffic and bottleneck link. Namely, the actual
simulation is done using 1 to 5000 compromised hosts each sending traffic at
a constant rate of 10 kbps, and the capacity of the bottleneck link is subse-
quently reduced to 500 kbps. My simulation topology is shown in Figure 4.7.
Since each compromised host is sending 10 kbps of constant-rate traffic, the
set of compromised hosts can be considered one powerful attacker that can
send traffic using the aggregate constant rate.
I set the bottleneck link as a legacy link that does not support SIFF, TVA,
or CRAFT. This legacy link may, for example, exist in an autonomous sys-
tem that has not yet deployed a capability system. Because the legacy link
does not support the capability system, when the legacy link can no longer
sustain the traffic sent by the attackers, it will start dropping packets. I then
simulate ten legitimate TCP end hosts each trying to send 100 files, each of
size 20 kByte. Each sender sends one file at a time, after the delivery of the
previous file is complete. A file delivery is considered complete either when
the entire file is successfully transferred or after the file experiences eight
timeouts, at which point the file transfer is considered to have failed with
transfer time of 1000 seconds. I then measure the fraction of file transfers
that successfully complete and the average transfer time of the legitimate
users’ successful file transfers. These metrics represent how well TCP traf-
fic can compete against the attackers when a capability-based DoS defense
mechanism is only partially deployed.
To build a realistic topology, I use the IPv4 Routed /24 Topology Dataset4
constructed from CAIDA scamper probes, a successor of skitter.5 Scamper
probes record the IP addresses of each hop from a source to a destination
and round trip times of intermediate hops as well as a final destination. The
destinations are randomly collected from the routed IPv4 /24 prefixes in the
BGP tables of the RouteViews project.6 By using the BGP tables to translate
IP addresses of intermediate hops into AS numbers, I construct an AS-level
4http://www.caida.org/data/active/ipv4 routed 24 topology dataset.xml
5http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/skitter
6http://www.routeviews.org
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Figure 4.7: Simulation topology: we construct an AS-level topology using a
data set of hop-by-hop delay measurements from the Internet. In the access
network of receivers, there is a shared link not deploying capability-based
systems.
topology in which each link has inter-AS delay. I use an August 2008 dataset
measured in San Jose, California by the RouteView project. A topology with
delay is necessary to accurately model TCP performance because congestion
window evolution depends on round trip time between end hosts [57]. To
the author’s knowledge, there is no Internet-scale link-bandwidth data, so I
set core routers’ link bandwidth of our topology at 10 Gbps so that the core
routers do not experience congestion. Figure 4.7 shows the simulation topol-
ogy including access networks, where ten legitimate users are connected to a
single common access AS and attackers’ access AS’s are chosen at random.
There exists a legacy link that does not deploy capability-based systems; this
link is shared by all attackers and legitimate users, and is denoted by the
thin segment in the box in Figure 4.7. The thick lines indicate links on which
the capability system is deployed.
4.5.5 Simulation Results
Figure 4.8 shows the fraction of file transfer completion and the average
transfer time of files. When the number of attackers is less than 100,000
(e.g., the aggregate constant traffic rate is less than 1 Gbps, the capacity
of the bottleneck), the aggregate attack traffic is less than the capacity of
the legacy link. Hence, all file transfers are successful and the average file
transfer times for all evaluated schemes are similar. When there are 100,000
attackers (e.g. the aggregate constant traffic rate is equal to 1 Gbps), the
aggregate attack traffic rate matches the bottleneck link bandwidth. All files
are still successfully transferred, but due to queuing at the bottleneck link, the
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Figure 4.8: Simulation results
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average transfer time increases. Specifically, the CRAFT system experienced
a 18-fold increase while SIFF and TVA both experienced a 68-fold increase
in the average transfer time, as shown in Figure 4.8(b).
CRAFT significantly outperforms SIFF and TVA in this situation because
attackers are limited by the CRAFT rate, thereby allowing legitimate users to
complete file transfer faster than users using other DoS-prevention schemes.
When the number of attackers exceeds 100,000, almost all file transfer at-
tempts fail under SIFF and TVA, and the average successful transfer time
increases sharply. CRAFT, on the other hand, provides perfect file trans-
fer success rates, and the growth rate of the average transfer time is much
smaller. A legacy link in a system that partially deploys SIFF and TVA can-
not provide fair service even though the flows going through the legacy link
come from users deploying SIFF or TVA. In contrast, in a partially deployed
CRAFT system, the attack traffic and the legitimate traffic both reduce their
traffic rates and share the bottleneck link in a TCP-fair manner.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the CRAFT protocol, which provides security against
DoS attackers by enforcing TCP-fairness on all flows that traverse a CRAFT
router. CRAFT does not suffer from common weaknesses observed in reactive
mechanisms, such as false alarms. Moreover, CRAFT also does not require
routers to trust each other.
A single CRAFT router can protect all links behind it; thus CRAFT can
be deployed incrementally and provide strong benefits even to very early de-
ploying end hosts. Our simulation showed that in realistic partial-deployment
environments, CRAFT can significantly outperform previously suggested
capability-based schemes in both packet delivery success rate and average
successful transfer time.
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CHAPTER 5
JIM-BEAM: JAMMING AND
INTERFERENCE MITIGATION USING
BEAM-FORMING ANTENNAS AND
RANDOMIZED ORIENTATION
In a wireless network, a serious threat to availability is jamming, where an
attacker injects noise into the frequency band used for communication, pre-
venting the receiver from correctly decoding data bits. The problem of jam-
ming mitigation has recently been heavily explored. In particular, spread
spectrum is a well-known method to resist interference when a secret (e.g. a
spreading code) is shared between a sender and a receiver [58]. Recent work
has extended this approach to broadcast environments, where the attacker
may have the ability to decode messages; these approaches rely on asym-
metric computational burdens [59] and asymmetric knowledge [60]. Other
coding-based approaches use indelible marks [61] to transmit messages that
cannot be erased by a malicious attacker.
Several uncoordinated spread spectrum (USS) techniques have been pro-
posed to address jamming mitigation in networks without any pre-shared
keys or spreading codes [59, 62, 63, 64]. A USS system generally has a pub-
lished set of possible codes, a transmitter sends a message using a spreading
code randomly chosen from among the published set of possible codes. Each
receiver finally exhaustively searches for the message using the set of possible
codes. Since learning the random spreading code enables a jammer to jam a
message, USS systems must assume that no jammer can determine the ran-
dom spreading code of a packet, and within the same packet duration, jam
with that information. As long as this constraint on the jammer’s compu-
tational ability is satisfied, the USS techniques are attractive since receivers
and the transmitter do not need to share a key in order to communicate;
thus USS can better support dynamic membership than traditional spread
spectrum techniques.
In this chapter, I extend the USS techniques by exploiting the orientations
of directional antennas, which is another line of traditional anti-jamming
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approaches. Compared to prior USS approaches that are based on coding,
directionality shows great promise for mitigating the jamming attack: In
coding-based approaches, a message is sent on a specific code, and an adver-
sary can choose to jam a single randomly selected code (called narrow-band
jamming), jam a set of randomly selected codes at reduced power (called
partial-band jamming), or jam the set of all codes at much reduced power
(called wideband jamming). Several studies, under different channel assump-
tions, conclude that the optimal proportion of spectrum on which to jam is a
function of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) [65, 66, 67]. In
particular, a powerful jammer’s optimal jamming strategy that maximally
increases the bit-error rate is wideband jamming.
However, each attacking transmitter can only be in a single place at any
instance in time. Thus, in an idealized scenario, a receiver using a sectored
antenna is either affected by that transmitter or not; that is, each adversarial
transmitter, physically, must act in a narrow-band fashion in the spatial
domain. In other words, directional antennas deprive powerful attackers of
the most effective attack methodology.
While the use of directional antennas can mitigate wideband jamming in
the spatial domain, their use seemingly contradicts the goal of a broadcast
message, which tries to reach all nodes within the neighborhood of a trans-
mitter. In this chapter, I explore the concept of using randomly oriented
directional antennas to mitigate persistent interference from jammers. In
particular, I extend previous randomization-based coding strategies to spa-
tial randomness. I let each wireless device be equipped with one or several
directional antennas. Each wireless device reorients the main-lobe of one
or more of its directional antennas toward different and randomly selected
directions at different times. I call my scheme JIM-Beam: Jamming and
Interference Mitigation using Beam-forming antennas.
JIM-Beam mitigates jamming by using directional antennas to physically
filter out the interference rather than using coding techniques. In other
words, in JIM-Beam, the antenna orientation, which is easy to conceal, is
hidden from the adversary, whereas USS techniques seek to conceal the trans-
mission frequency from malicious jammers, even though the transmission fre-
quency can be determined by the receiver in a timely manner. Thus, unlike
previously proposed USS approaches, JIM-Beam does not need to constrain
the computation capability of an attacker or its reaction time. Moreover,
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JIM-Beam can be used in any narrow-band system, unlike spread spectrum
(coordinated or otherwise) systems, which require a wide frequency spectrum
in order to spread the transmitted signals. If a wide spectrum is allocated,
JIM-Beam can be combined with spread spectrum techniques to offer even
better jamming mitigation ability.
Like USS techniques, the goal of JIM-Beam is to mitigate the jamming at-
tack and to establish communication channels without any pre-shared keys.
The resulting communication channels can, in turn, be used to bootstrap
other security properties, such as authentication (by setting up a key), or
availability (by setting up a spreading code). However, optimizing the net-
work capacity is specifically not the goal of JIM-Beam.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
1. I propose JIM-Beam, a jamming mitigation protocol that exploits spa-
tial randomness. I also discuss several benefits of JIM-Beam over un-
coordinated spread spectrum techniques. Additionally, as an orthogo-
nal approach, JIM-Beam can combine uncoordinated spread spectrum
techniques to provide better jamming mitigation.
2. I theoretically analyze the feasibility of JIM-Beam and perform Monte
Carlo simulations of a flooding network to understand JIM-Beam’s ben-
efits when jammers are present.
3. I analyze the security of JIM-Beam and show that JIM-Beam can mit-
igate reactive jamming.
5.1 System and Attacker Models
In this section, I detail my system model and my attacker model. Specifically,
I detail the hardware requirements of my protocol and discuss the attack my
protocol seeks to mitigate.
5.1.1 System Model
In my protocol, a network device is equipped with at least one directional
antenna and maybe one omni-directional antenna, depending on the variant
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of my protocol in use. I analyze my protocol in the scenario where each
device has only one directional antenna; however, my protocol can be readily
extended to use multiple directional antennas. Moreover, I assume that the
orientation of the main lobe of the directional antenna is steerable. I discuss
antenna choices in detail in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3.
As an alternative to a steerable antenna, a device can be equipped with
multiple directional antennas that partition the space; that is, the main lobe
of each antenna covers a disjoint portion of the space, and the antennas
together cover the entire space. In this special case, the node can emulate an
omni-directional antenna by using all sectors simultaneously. Steering the
main lobe is then equivalent to turning on the appropriate antenna. This
is a special case where neither an omni-directional antenna nor a steerable
antenna is necessary.
I also assume that benign network devices are half-duplex. That is, when-
ever a benign device is transmitting, it cannot receive due to self-interference.
Choi et al. recently propose that single-channel radios can be made full-
duplex [68]. While full-duplex radios are able to improve the throughput of
the network, the use of such radios does not fundamentally alter the opera-
tion of my protocol. In particular, while full-duplex enables the possibility
of reactive jamming, it does not have a significant impact on a node’s ability
to avoid being jammed.
5.1.2 Attacker Model
I consider an attacker that is interested in denying availability to the network.
The jammer reaction and computation assumptions are very strong. Other
than the requirement of causality, in which an attacker cannot react to a
future event, I do not limit the computation ability of an attacker or place
any restriction on the amount of time between when an attacker hears a
message and when it is able to start jamming in response to that message.
Higher-layer protocols may use conventional cryptographic mechanisms, such
as encryption or digital signatures, but JIM-Beam itself does not rely on any
form of computational security.
I consider an attacker that injects interference into the communication
channel. The injected interference can be either noise-like (i.e. jamming) or
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correctly modulated with incorrect data (i.e. corruption by overwriting). I
do not distinguish between these two cases since if either form of interference
shadows the original data packet, the overlapping portion of the original data
packet would be corrupted with high probability. I also do not specifically
consider any replay attacks. An attacker that replays packets helps with
delivering those packets, and is not in the attacker’s interest.
5.2 Related Work
Prior studies propose using directional antennas to avoid interference and col-
lisions in order to improve network performance. Zander analyzes a forward
progress metric and concludes that in a slotted-ALOHA multi-hop network,
using directional antennas with optimal orientation control can improve its
performance greatly by reducing the risk of destructive packet collisions [69].
Yi et al. analyze the capacity of a network using a directional antenna for
sending, receiving, or both [70]. The authors concluded that receiving using
a directional antenna improves the network capacity by avoiding interfer-
ence, and that transmitting using a directional antenna further improves the
network capacity by providing better spatial reuse. These theoretical studies
motivate the feasibility of JIM-Beam’s approach; however, JIM-Beam’s main
goal is to provide an available channel in networks without any pre-shared
keys and does not focus on network capacity.
Lu et al. [71] propose that transmitters should use directional antennas in
order to conceal their locations, since attackers outside the main-lobe are less
likely to detect the presence of the transmitter. The goal of my protocol is
not to conceal the transmitter’s presence, but to mitigate jamming. Thus, I
instead propose that the receivers use directional antennas to receive packets.
Nikolaidis et al. [72] and Sani et al. [73] propose adaptively changing the
directional antenna orientation in order to minimize the received interference.
While these protocols work well against a slow-moving source of interference,
a sophisticated set of jammers may be able to coordinate and force the nodes
in the network to orient their directional antennas in a particular direction
and subsequently disrupt the network availability. My approach thus sug-
gests using randomized orientation so as to increase the required resources
for jamming to be successful.
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Noubir proposes using a sectored directional antenna to maintain network
connectivity under jamming [74]. This prior study focuses on the optimal
placement of jammers and the minimum number of jammers required to
reduce the connectivity index of the network to 0. The author empirically
concluded that in order to reduce the network connectivity index to 0, the
number of jammers appears linearly proportional to the number of antenna
sectors. My work, on the other hand, focuses on a flooding algorithm that
provides physical-layer availability even under the jamming attack by taking
advantage of the improved connectivity when network devices are equipped
with directional antennas.
Many studies also employ spread spectrum techniques in order to avoid
interference [58, 59, 60]. However, two devices can use spread spectrum to
communicate only if the receiver can decode the transmission. Traditionally,
the transmitter and the receiver encodes and decodes, respectively, using a
shared key [58].
Recently, Strasser et al. propose the uncoordinated frequency hopping
(UFH) scheme, which randomizes the frequency channels occupied in a slow-
frequency-hopping spread spectrum scheme [62]. In UFH, the transmitter
randomly selects a frequency channel on which to transmit, and each receiver
also randomly selects a frequency channel on which to listen. If the trans-
mitter and the receiver choose the same frequency channel at the same time,
an event called rendezvous, the receiver is able to receive the transmission
given sufficiently high SINR. Many follow-up studies extend the randomiza-
tion idea to other coding techniques [59, 63, 64]. The common theme of this
line of research is to use randomization in coding so that by the time the
jammer learns the spreading code, the receivers have already received (al-
though not necessarily have decoded) the associated packet; thus a jammer
cannot reactively jam the signal. In other words, the goal of these schemes is
to conceal the code space on which a transmitter operates, so that the jammer
cannot discover that code and jam the message until after the message has
been successfully received. My protocol instead randomizes the orientation
of the main lobe of the directional antenna to conceal the direction in which a
receiver is listening, so that even if the jammer can hear the transmission, the
receivers have a chance of eliminating the malicious interference. My strat-
egy of hiding the reception allows my protocol to be able to defend against
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reactive jamming without making any assumptions about the computation
ability or reaction time of a jammer.
5.3 JIM-Beam Flooding Protocol
I first present the basic JIM-Beam protocol, which introduces the basic con-
cept of JIM-Beam without introducing any complicating optimizations. I
then optimize JIM-Beam by adopting retransmissions and random backoff
to provide persistent service that alleviates the broadcast storm; I also use
directional antennas for both transmission and reception in order to take
advantage of the better spatial reuse offered by directional antennas.
5.3.1 Basic JIM-Beam
The basic JIM-Beam scheme is similar to the basic flooding protocol: If a
node receives a packet it has not seen before, the node rebroadcasts that
packet so other nodes can also receive and pass it on.
In basic JIM-Beam, time is divided into time slots. At the beginning of a
frame, consisting of T time slots, each network node randomly selects a new
orientation and re-orients the main lobe of its directional antenna. The node
then opportunistically receives packets from its neighbors that are located
in the randomly chosen direction. If a node receives a packet it has not
seen before, the node immediately broadcasts that packet using its omni-
directional antenna in the next time slot.
5.3.2 B(ackoff) R(epeat) T(ransmit)-JIM-Beam
In the basic JIM-Beam protocol, the nodes that have heard a data transmis-
sion are likely to be close to each other since they share a common neighbor
(i.e. the transmitter). When these nodes immediately rebroadcast that mes-
sage, they will cause a broadcast storm, which results in a large number of
collisions. I thus incorporate into the JIM-Beam protocol the random-backoff
technique that is known to effectively mitigate the broadcast storm. In BRT-
JIM-Beam, before each transmission, a transmitter waits for a random num-
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ber of time slots. Two nearby transmitters are thus likely to transmit at
different times, reducing the number of collisions.
Since the main lobe is oriented randomly, a JIM-Beam receiver’s direc-
tional antenna indiscriminatingly suppresses transmissions from both benign
transmitters and malicious jammers. In other words, there is a non-zero
chance that a receiving node cannot hear its transmitting neighbor because
of suboptimal antenna orientation. Thus in BRT-JIM-Beam, the transmitter
retransmits each packet several times. Probabilistic optimal antenna orien-
tation enables a JIM-Beam receiver to receive from the transmitter similarly
to how rendezvous enables UFH receivers to receive from the transmitter.
The use of retransmission can be replaced by network coding, where multi-
ple packets that are awaiting transmission are combined together using tech-
niques such as Raptor Codes. Using network coding to distribute data when
links are temporally inconsistent is also proposed by Papadimitratos et al.
in a vehicular ad hoc network setting to distribute the certificate revocation
list [75].
Additionally, BRT-JIM-Beam allows a node to use the same directional
antenna for both reception and transmission, thereby reducing the number
of antennas needed for the protocol. In BRT-JIM-Beam, the transmitter also
selects a random direction to orient the main lobe of its directional antenna
for every frame.
In summary, the BRT-JIM-Beam protocol retains the same packet recep-
tion behavior as the basic JIM-Beam protocol. However, when a node wants
to transmit a packet, either to initiate a new flood or to forward a packet
that the node has not previously forwarded, the sender does not transmit the
packet right away; rather, it performs backoff and repetition coding. Before
each broadcast attempt, the node randomly chooses a backoff counter BC,
BC ←R [0,BCmax] (where the maximum backoff counter, BCmax, is a sys-
tem parameter), and transmits using the directional antenna after BC time
slots. The sender broadcasts each message B times, possibly coded with
other packets, to give neighboring receivers a better chance of receiving the
packet.
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5.4 Discussion on JIM-Beam Parameters
The most important parameters of the JIM-Beam protocol are the beam-
solid-angle, maximum directivity, and the lobe steering ability of the di-
rectional antenna. Other parameters that also impact the performance of
the JIM-Beam protocol include frame duration and, in the BRT-JIM-Beam
variant, the maximum backoff counter and number of repeated broadcasts
for each packet. In this section, I discuss how each parameter impacts the
JIM-Beam protocol and present a gain analysis and a connectivity analysis.
5.4.1 Beam-Solid-Angle and Maximum Directivity of an
Antenna
The beam-solid-angle and the maximum directivity are two important fac-
tors that determine the antenna’s ability to mitigate interference. Given
an antenna radiation pattern, the beam-solid-angle ΩA is defined to be the
integral of the normalized radiation intensity over the entire space. Equiva-
lently, if an antenna concentrates all its radiation into a solid cone, the cone
would have a solid angle of ΩA. Considering only a 2-dimensional plane,
an omni-directional antenna has beam-solid-angle of 2pi. The beam-solid-
angle is inversely proportional to the probability that a node receives from a
randomly placed signal/interference source.
The directivity of an antenna in a certain orientation is defined to be the
antenna’s radiation in that orientation divided by the average radiation of the
antenna. Thus, the maximum directivity of an antenna is equal to the peak-
to-mean ratio of the antenna’s radiation pattern. When a benign transmitter
is optimally located within the main lobe and a single interference source is
outside the main lobe, then on average the benign transmission enjoys a gain
equaling the antenna’s maximum directivity. In other words, the antenna
directivity is similar to the coding gain in spread spectrum systems: correct
orientation (code choice) provides antenna (processing) gain.
To illustrate the definition of beam-solid-angle and directivity, I consider
two commercial directional antennas: an Anritsu 2000-1414 antenna1 and an
SMC DIFP18 antenna.2 The radiation patterns included in the data sheets
1data sheet: http://www.anritsu.co.uk/files/11410-00376.pdf
2data sheet: http://www.smc.com/files/AP/DS ANT.pdf
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are shown in Figure 5.1. The Anritsu 2000-1414 antenna has a beam-solid-
angle ΩA = 0.163 · (2pi) and a maximum directivity of 6.138. The SMC
DIFP18 antenna has a beam-solid-angle ΩA = 0.042 · (2pi) and a maximum
directivity of 23.668.
5.4.2 Gain Analysis
In this section, I study the ratio between the received power of the intended
signal and the received power of the interference. In particular, I compare the
antenna gain from using a directional antenna with the processing gain from
using frequency hopping (FH) and direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS).
I consider a case where a receiver using an omni-directional antenna and
no coding would receive equal power from the intended transmitter and from
a malicious jammer. The jammer is aware of the modulation scheme used
by the transmitter. For each interference mitigation technique, I consider a
different attack strategy. For DSSS, the jammer emits a uniformly-random
level of voltage for each chip. For FHSS, the jammer selects a number of
hopping patterns on which to emit power uniformly at random and divides
his power equally across those random channels. When two of the attacker’s
hopping patterns use the same frequency channel for a single chip, the jammer
doubles his transmission power in that channel. Against directional antennas,
a randomly located jammer constantly emits power into the channel. When
the main lobe of the receiver’s directional antenna is oriented away from the
jammer, the jammer’s interference is reduced.
Since the antenna gain is related to the directivity of a directional antenna,
I choose the chip length of a spread spectrum code to be the maximum direc-
tivity, rounded up to the next integer. Again, I consider the two directional
antennas mentioned earlier: the Anritsu 2000-1414 antenna and the SMC
DIFP18 antenna, with directivity of 6.14 and 23.67, respectively. I then
perform a Monte Carlo analysis to compare the antenna gain of the Anritsu
directional antenna to the processing gain of 7-chip FHSS and DSSS systems.
I similarly compare the SMC antenna to 24-chip FHSS and DSSS systems.
To show the best-case scenario for a directional antenna system, I also con-
sider in each case the performance of a solid-beam sectored antenna that has
equal directivity but no side lobe; that is, it has zero gain outside of its solid
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(a) Radiation pattern of Anritsu 2000-1414
(b) Radiation pattern of SMCANT-DIFP18
Figure 5.1: Radiation patterns of two commercial directional antennas
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beam. In each case, I include a minimum noise floor at a level equal to the
minimum gain of each commercial antenna; in the Anritsu case this level is
28 dB below the transmission power, and in the SMC case this level is 30 dB
below the transmission power.
Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative distribution function of my results. The
x-axis of each plot shows the gain (antenna or processing) enjoyed by each
jamming mitigation system on a logarithmic scale, and the y-axis shows the
probability that the gain will be less than the x-axis. Thus curves that
are farther to the right reflect better performance. The figure shows that
directional antennas occasionally offer no gain at all since the probability that
the attacker is located within the orientation of the main lobe is higher than
the probability that the attacker’s random guesses are highly correlated with
the transmitted spreading code. Furthermore, the maximum gain achievable
by a commercial antenna is less than the maximum gain in spread spectrum
systems because the commercial antenna’s interference rejection ability is
limited by its minimum gain in the side lobe. However, at the median and
for over 60% of the time, the directional antenna is clearly better than using
either spread spectrum technique, as shown by the CDF being farther to the
right at y ∈ [0.25, 0.85] when using the Anritsu antenna. Furthermore, with
increased directivity, the directional antenna scheme provides better results.
5.4.3 Steering the Main Lobe of a Directional Antenna
Because JIM-Beam uses randomized directional antenna orientation for inter-
ference rejection, each JIM-Beam node must be able to steer the main lobe
of its antenna so that the main lobe can be randomly oriented over time.
There are two means by which a node can steer its main lobe: The node can
physically (mechanically) reorient its directional antenna so that the main
lobe is also reoriented, or the node can electrically change the property of
the antenna so that its main lobe is reoriented without physically moving the
antenna.
The two commercial antennas I discussed in Section 5.4.1, Anritsu 2000-
1414 and SMC DIFP18, do not have reconfigurable main lobes. Thus, to
reorient these antennas, the nodes can rotate them by mounting them on a
motor. Although motorizing a directional antenna can provide the reorienta-
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the CDF of the antenna and processing gain
obtained from antenna directivity and spreading.
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tion required by JIM-Beam, it has several drawbacks. A motorized antenna
incurs additional energy consumption, which may be undesirable in networks
sensitive to energy consumption, such as sensor networks. Motors can also
generate emissions in fume and heat, which may present a side channel that
an attacker can exploit.
Certain directional antennas can be reconfigured electrically. For example,
an antenna array is steerable by exciting each individual element carefully.
Boerman and Bernhard present a pattern reconfigurable antenna that is made
of two parasitic strips with reconfigurable lengths. The authors show that
the antenna has a 60◦ beam-width and the orientation of the main lobe
can change by ±35◦ [76]. As the field of reconfigurable antenna matures, I
believe such designs can greatly improve the performance and security of the
JIM-Beam protocol.
5.4.4 Frame Duration
Depending on the extent to which nodes are time-synchronized, JIM-Beam
offers great freedom in partitioning time into time slots and frames. If all
network nodes are weakly time-synchronized, then all nodes can agree on a
schedule in which time is divided into time slots. In each time slot, there is
a transmission portion and a setup portion. In the transmission portion of a
time slot, each node transmits or listens according to the JIM-Beam protocol,
and in the setup portion of a time slot, each node reorients its directional
antenna. The frame duration in this synchronized case is one time slot.
On the other hand, if network nodes are not time-synchronized, then the
receiver should stay on a single orientation for at least the duration of two
data packet transmissions. If the receiver stayed on an orientation only
for one time slot, then the sender and receiver may not have synchronized
packet start times, so the receiver would move away before it finishes its
packet reception. To reduce the chance that a receiver will reorient away
from a sender during a packet transmission, the frame duration should be
two or more time slots. The period of time that a receiver can safely stay
on a single orientation depends on the ability of the jammer to find that
orientation.
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5.4.5 Maximum Backoff Counter
To avoid the broadcast storm problem, BRT-JIM-Beam uses the backoff
mechanism to spread out transmissions in time. The optimal choice of maxi-
mum backoff counter BCmax depends on the network density and any latency
requirement. In a dense network, since more nodes may be waiting to trans-
mit, the maximum allowed backoff counter should be greater than that used
in a sparse network in order to avoid heavy collisions. However, excessive
backoff impacts the performance of the network due to increased transmis-
sion latency for each packet. Thus, the optimal BCmax is the smallest one
that satisfies the network quality-of-service requirements.
5.4.6 Number of Repeated Broadcasts for Each Packet
Since each JIM-Beam node randomly selects the orientation of its directional
antenna, a receiver may be located within the transmission range of a neigh-
boring node, and yet still not be able to receive the packet. BRT-JIM-Beam
thus uses rebroadcasts to reduce the probability that a direct neighbor does
not receive the packet. Although rebroadcasting persistently diminishes the
probability that a neighboring node misses a data packet due to subopti-
mal orientation, it also increases the probability of collisions in a dense net-
work. As a general rule, to avoid incurring collisions, the optimal number
of rebroadcasts is negatively correlated to both the beam-solid-angle of the
directional antenna and the network density.
5.4.7 Connectivity Analysis
In this section, I analyze the connectivity of a JIM-Beam node. In partic-
ular, I analyze the probability that a JIM-Beam receiver receives a single
message without collision by considering the number of benign transmitters,
the number of jammers, the number of repeated broadcasts, and the maxi-
mum backoff counter.
For my analysis, I consider a receiver equipped with a sectored directional
antenna and located at the center of a circular field. The receiving node
experiences a certain noise floor, which limits its receiving range. I then
consider the free-space model with a decoding threshold of δ = 2 = 3 dB;
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Figure 5.3: Monte Carlo simulation result of the collision-free probability
that is, if the power of the strongest signal received is 3 dB stronger than the
sum of power from all other transmissions, the strongest signal is declared
received. When only two packets are sent simultaneously, they collide if
and only if both packets are received at the same time with signal strengths
within 3 dB of each other. I simulate N+J homogeneous transmitting nodes
within the circular field, out of which N are benign and J are malicious
jammers. The receiver can receive a message only if a transmission from a
benign transmitter is more powerful than the sum of all other transmissions
by the decoding threshold.
I first ignore the impact of using a sectored antenna, and try to understand
the behavior of the collision probability with respect to the number of nodes.
In Section 5.4.8, I derive two loose bounds on the probability that a node
receives one transmission; the collision-free probability pcf (k) is bounded by
1
kδ
≤ pcf (k) ≤ 1δ , where k is the number of transmitters in the field and δ is
the signal-to-noise threshold for decoding. Figure 5.3 shows these two loose
bounds, 1
δ log(k)
, and the empirical results from my Monte Carlo simulation.
I now take into account the impact of using a directional antenna. Let
n < N be the number of benign nodes in the receiver’s main lobe and j < J
be the number of jammers in the receiver’s main lobe. I also model the backoff
mechanism with maximum backoff counter BCmax. Given that the sectored
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antenna has a beam-width of Ω, the normalized beam-width is defined to be
∆ = Ω
2pi
, which is the fraction of space covered by the beam width. I also
define b(K, k, q) as the probability that, when each of K elements is chosen
with probability q, exactly k elements are chosen. Specifically, b follows the
binomial distribution:
b(K, k, q) =
(
K
k
)
qk(1− q)K−k.
Then the probability that a node receives a packet without collision is given
by
N∑
n=0
J∑
j=0
n∑
t=0
f(n, t, j)
(
t
t+ j
)
pcf (t+ j),
where f(n, t, j) = b(N, n,∆)b(J, j,∆)b
(
n, t, 1
BCmax
)
.
The f(n, t, j) term signifies that out of N benign transmitters and J jam-
mers, n and j are within the antenna beam, respectively, and out of n benign
transmitters, t are transmitting and n − t are still waiting for the backoff
process. Since there are t + j transmitters within the reception range, the
collision-free probability is pcf (t + j); additionally, only benign transmitters
send useful packets, giving rise to the t
t+j
term.
The probability of receiving at least one out of B repeated broadcasts of
a single packet can then be approximated as:
P[receive] = 1− (1− P[no collision])B.
5.4.8 Bounds on Pcf(k)
In this section, I derive the upper and lower bounds on Pcf (k+1) with respect
to k. We can make two key observations: First, if the ith-closest transmit-
ter is at distance di, then if d2 ≤ d1
√
δ, then the ratio between the closer
transmitter’s power and the farther transmitter’s power will be less than δ
(assuming free-space propagation loss, which is proportional to d2), which
ensures the loss of both packets. Second, if di ≥ d1
√
kδ for all transmit-
ters other than the closest, then a collision is impossible, because each of k
transmitters contributes power less than 1
kδ
of the closest transmitter. The
sum of all interfering traffic, then, is less than 1
δ
of the power of the closest
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transmitter, so the packet is guaranteed to be received (without considering
the effect of noise).
The reception range of a receiver is defined as the distance from the trans-
mitter at which the received signal power is δ times higher than the expe-
rienced noise. I denote the reception range of the receiver as r, and let the
field be a circle with radius R ≥ r.
First note that the transmitters are scattered uniformly and independently
across the field; additionally, the events “transmitter ti is closest to the re-
ceiver” and “transmitter tj is closest to the receiver” are disjoint for j 6= i
(i.e. they cannot both happen at the same time). Thus, the collision-free
probability is less than the probability that the second closest transmitter is√
δ farther away from the receiver than the closest transmitter:
pcf (k + 1)
≤ (k + 1)
∫ r
d1=0
2
R2
d1 ·∫ R
d2,d3,...,dk+1=
√
δd1
(
2
R2
)k k∏
t=2
dt · ddt · · · dd1
= (k + 1)
∫ r
d1=0
2
R2
d1
(
1− δd
2
1
R2
)k
dd1.
By substituting γ = 1− δd21
R2
and finishing the integration, obtain
pcf (k + 1) ≤ 1
δ
(
1−
(
1− δr
2
R2
)k)
.
Similarly, by using the second observation, obtain a lower bound:
pcf (k + 1) ≥ 1
kδ
(
1−
(
1− δr
2
R2
)k)
.
In the special case where r = R√
δ
, the upper bound reduces to pcf (k) ≤ 1δ
and the lower bound reduces to pcf (k) ≥ 1(k−1)δ . Empirically, in Section 5.4.7
I show the behavior of pcf (k) appears to be correlated with log(k).
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5.5 Security Analysis of JIM-Beam
I analyze the security of JIM-Beam under two particular attacks:
1. Jamming and corrupting a portion of a data packet; and
2. Inserting false packets to exhaust computation.
For ease of analysis and only for this section, I analyze the security of the
JIM-Beam protocol using a sectored directional antenna.
5.5.1 Jamming by Corrupting Part of a Packet
A data packet usually consists of some number of bits of actual data and is
accompanied by some number of error correcting bits. The error correcting
portion is usually much smaller in length than the actual data portion. The
error correcting bits are used so that if a small number of bits are not success-
fully received because of erasures or noise, those bits can still be recovered.
For example, a common Reed-Solomon code encodes 223 bytes of data with
32 bytes of error correcting code, so that one 255-byte packet can correct up
to 16 bytes = 128 bits of errors.
A jammer does not need to interfere with the entire packet in order to
disrupt connectivity, but only needs to corrupt a significant portion of the
packet so that the packet is not recoverable by error correction coding. In
the above Reed-Solomon example, a jammer only needs to corrupt 16 bytes,
or 6.3%, of the packet in order to make it uncorrectable.
I analyze two scenarios. In the first scenario, the normalized beam-width,
Ω
2pi
, of the receiver’s sectored directional antenna is larger than the error
correction portion of the data packet (0.063 in the above Reed-Solomon ex-
ample). In this case, a jamming strategy is to revolve around the receiver.
If a jammer can make one complete revolution around the receiver over the
duration of a data packet, the jammer can always corrupt a portion of the
data packet large enough so as to render the packet uncorrectable. If a jam-
mer can only make
θj
2pi
< 1 revolution over the duration of the packet, the
jammer can corrupt a packet with probability
θj+Ω
2pi
< p <
θj+2Ω
2pi
. The dura-
tion of a packet transmission can be determined from the packet length and
transmission rate.
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I consider an example where a spherical node with radius 10 cm uses a
sectored directional antenna with beam-width Ω = 60 degrees to receive
a data packet 1472 bytes in size transmitted at a rate of 11 Mbps. The
packet size and transmission rate corresponds to common figures in a 802.11b
network. The packet duration is 1472·8
11·106 ≈ 1.07 ms. If a jammer wishes to
revolve around the receiver in order to corrupt a data packet with probability
1, the jammer needs to make at least two-third of a revolution within 1.07 ms.
Using Newtonian physics, this corresponds to a radial acceleration of α =(
2/3
0.00107
)2
· 0.1 = 3957 g, where g is the earth’s gravitational pull. As a point
of comparison, a Formula One race car can turn3 with a radial acceleration
of around 6 g.
In the second scenario, the normalized beam-width of the receiver’s sec-
tored antenna is smaller than half of the error correction portion of the data
packet. In this case, the ratio between the time a jammer must remain in
a single antenna sector and the packet duration is larger than the ratio be-
tween the angular width of the sectored antenna and a full revolution. In
other words, even if a single jammer has the ability to revolve around the
network node once every packet duration (which requires extreme accelera-
tion, as discussed above), the probability that he can corrupt a significant
portion of the packet so as to make the packet uncorrectable is still less than
one.
5.5.2 Packet Insertion Attacks
In JIM-Beam, as in previous randomized spread spectrum studies, a trans-
mitting node and a receiving node communicate without a pre-shared key or
schedule; and packets may be received out-of-order. A malicious attacker can
thus seek to corrupt a data stream by inserting bogus packets. Exhaustively
searching all packets for the correct stream is exponential in computation
time and is infeasible for a receiver with realistic computational ability.
Because the problem of message injection is fundamentally a problem of
message authentication, allowing packets to be sufficiently large so that an en-
tire authenticator can fit inside the packet can mitigate the message injection
attack. For example, current public key cryptography schemes such as RSA
3http://www.formula1.com/news/headlines/2009/9/10005.html
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and ECDSA have signatures and certificates that are each no larger than
200 bytes; symmetric and unconditionally secure authentication (e.g. [77])
have authenticators that are typically on the order of 20 bytes. My scheme
shows strong performance with 1472 byte messages at 11 Mbps, and can
likely extend to larger packets (in my earlier example, 94 kB packets still
require the jammer to revolve at over 6 g acceleration), which means that
my scheme is compatible with nearly every reasonable authentication scheme
in the literature. This is in contrast to USS protocols that require each frame
to be shorter than the jammer’s reaction time (e.g. [62]), in which case it
may not be possible to insert a strong authenticator in each frame.
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 Methodology
We perform Monte Carlo simulations using MATLAB to study the effec-
tiveness of JIM-Beam by measuring and comparing the packet delivery ratio
between three different flooding protocols:
1. Flooding with backoff and retries, using omni-directional antennas for
both transmitting and receiving;
2. BRT-JIM-Beam; and
3. Uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH).
I perform two sets of simulations for BRT-JIM-Beam and UFH. In the first
set, I equip each BRT-JIM-Beam node with an Anritsu 2000-1414 directional
antenna, and I let each UFH node randomly choose to transmit or listen on
one of seven orthogonal frequency channels. In the second set, I equip each
JIM-Beam node with an SMCANT-DIFP18 directional antenna, and let each
UFH node choose from 24 orthogonal frequency channels.
For all protocols, I assume that a node is able to receive a message if
the power of that message is higher than the sum of interferences by the
decode threshold δ = 2 = 3 dB. In the BRT-JIM-Beam simulations, I take
into account all interference sources including noise, fading, and signals from
both the main-lobe and the side-lobes of the directional antenna.
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I define distances in terms of units of transmission distance: When a single
transmitter and single receiver are separated by one unit, and no other nodes
are transmitting, the signal power at the receiver is 3 dB higher than the noise
power (which consists only of the noise floor). Since my decode threshold is
3 dB, a unit represents the distance at which a packet can be received with
50% probability.4 In my simulation, I have a field that is 4 unit-distance by
4 unit-distance. For all simulated protocols, I choose a maximum backoff
counter BCmax = 10, and 5 rebroadcasts for every packet. I randomly select
a benign node as the initiator, and let it transmit a data packet.
I assume a homogeneous network in which all nodes transmit at the same
power level. I uniformly randomly distribute benign nodes and jammers on
the field. The number of benign nodes ranges from 8 to 800 nodes, corre-
sponding to a node density of 0.5 to 50 nodes per square unit-distance. In
addition to the benign nodes, the number of jammers ranges from 0 to 50%
of the number of benign nodes. For each combination of protocol, number of
benign nodes, and number of attackers, I performed 250 runs of simulation.
I let each jammer’s transmission power equal a benign transmitter’s trans-
mission power. A jammer that can emit a higher level of power can be con-
sidered as several weaker colluding jammers at the same location. I simulate
the following jammer strategy:
1. The jammers remain stationary on the field;
2. The jammers jam using omni-directional antennas; and
3. In UFH simulation, each jammer chooses one frequency channel on
which to inject interference.
Previous study discussed in detail the number of frequency channels on
which the jammers should jam in order to degrade system performance the
most [62]. Thus, my one-channel jamming strategy presents an upper bound
on the performance of the UFH system.
All transmissions, benign or malicious, are subject to fading, and I adopt
a Rician fading channel with parameter K = 10. In a Rician channel, a
signal is split into two portions: a line-of-sight portion and a non-line-of-
sight multi-path portion; the ratio in power between these two portions is
4Since noise from the noise floor is random, it can help or hurt a packet; thus packets
can be lost inside of a unit transmission distance and can be received outside a unit
transmission distance, with nonzero probability.
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K. In other words, in my Rician fading channel, the line-of-sight signal is 10
times more powerful than the multi-path signal. Previous measurement work
by Puccinelli and Haenggi suggest K = 17.5 in an indoor environment [78];
thus my assumption of K = 10 is a conservative choice. I also assume the
signal suffers a path loss exponent of σ = 2.2. That is, doubling the distance
between transmitter and the receiver makes the received transmission (1 −
2−2.2) = 78% weaker (this figure would be 75% in the free-space model).
I calculate the packet delivery ratio by calculating the fraction of benign
nodes that have received the data packet at the time the flooding stops. In
particular, if all benign nodes received the data packet, the packet delivery
ratio is 1; if no nodes other than the initiator received the data packet, and
there are N benign nodes, then the packet delivery ratio is 1/N .
5.6.2 Monte Carlo Simulation Results
Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 show the packet delivery ratio (PDR)
versus the density of benign nodes on the field. The error bars represent the
95% confidence intervals across my 250 runs per data point. I plot a different
curve for each different ratio between jammers and benign nodes. Observe
that with all protocols, intuitively, the packet delivery ratio decreases with
respect to the number of jammers.
Figure 5.4 shows the performance of a flooding network using random
backoff and multiple retries for each forwarding message, but without any
mechanisms to mitigate jamming. Observe that even a small number of
jammers is able to disrupt the connectivity of the network. Specifically, even
at j = 10%, the PDR drops to less than 0.4.
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the performance of the BRT-JIM-Beam
and the UFH protocols. From these figures, one can make the following
observations:
1. In sparse networks, BRT-JIM-Beam significantly outperforms
UFH. From the left side of Figure 5.5(b), observe that when nodes are
sparsely populated, the UFH protocol hurts the PDR because the few
neighboring nodes must be both within range and listening to the cor-
rect frequency channel. However, using a directional antenna for trans-
mission extends the range of the transmitter; thus, BRT-JIM-Beam is
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Figure 5.4: Packet delivery ratio of flooding with backoff and retries
able to reach more nodes even in sparse networks as observed from
Figure 5.5(a). This observation is further supported by Figure 5.6(a)
and Figure 5.6(b).
2. In overly dense networks, BRT-JIM-Beam and UFH both suf-
fer from broadcast storm. Since neither BRT-JIM-Beam nor UFH
employ any handshake mechanism, transmitters that are within range
of each other would inevitably interfere with each other occasionally.
Thus, in an overly dense network where a large number of transmitters
are clustered together, the performance of both schemes deteriorates.
3. BRT-JIM-Beam is able to use less power than UFH to provide
comparable jamming resilience. Since I define distance based on
a node’s transmission range, a dense network can transform itself to a
sparse network by reducing the transmission power of the nodes. Hence,
to achieve the same level of PDR, the required transmission power of
each BRT-JIM-Beam node is lower than that of a UFH network. This
property is highly desirable to networks that are sensitive to energy
consumption.
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(a) Flooding using BRT-JIM-Beam with Anritsu 2000-1414
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(b) Flooding using UFH with seven frequency channels
Figure 5.5: Comparative results of the packet delivery ratio between
JIM-Beam and UFH (∆ = 6.138, η = 7)
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(a) Flooding using BRT-JIM-Beam with SMCANT-DIFP18
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(b) Flooding using UFH with 24 frequency channels
Figure 5.6: Comparative results of the packet delivery ratio between
JIM-Beam and UFH (∆ = 23.67, η = 24)
109
5.7 Integrating Other Anti-Jamming Schemes
JIM-Beam provides strong jamming mitigation capabilities whenever the di-
rectional antenna is pointed away from the jammer. In particular, commer-
cial off-the-shelf directional antennas allow my scheme to attenuate jammer
signals by up to 28–30 dB. However, in certain environments, the jammer
may have access to much more power than ordinary transmitters. In such
environments, JIM-Beam can be combined with an existing anti-jamming
mechanism. In this section, I explore how JIM-Beam’s integration with
other schemes can help improve the security of the overall system against
very strong attackers.
When used in concert with another anti-jamming system, JIM-Beam lim-
its the number of attackers that can have impact at any given time. This
combination provides benefits to both JIM-Beam’s performance and the per-
formance of the anti-jamming system. In this section, I will use as a running
example a Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum code that sends 10 chips per
bit.
When the jammer is out of the main lobe in which JIM-Beam is receiving,
the attacker is attenuated by up to 30 dB. This increased attenuation means
that the overlying anti-jamming system does not need to provide as much
protection; for example, combining the 10 dB DSSS scheme with a 30 dB
attenuation from JIM-Beam provides 40 dB of total jammer attenuation. To
obtain 40 dB of gain from DSSS alone would require 10,000 chips per bit,
or a factor of 1000 additional overhead. Likewise, to obtain 40 dB of gain
from JIM-Beam alone may require an excessively directive antenna, which
may also impact the probability of receiving from a benign transmitter.
When the jammer is in the main lobe in which JIM-Beam is receiving,
DSSS is the sole source of jamming mitigation. However, because of direc-
tionality, DSSS needs to tolerate fewer jammers than if it were used alone.
For example, if the directivity is 6.14, as in the Anritsu antenna, DSSS needs
to handle only approximately one-sixth of the total number of jammers in
expectation. Another way to say this is that if 17.8 dB is ordinarily needed
to reject all jammers, then 10 dB together with an antenna with directivity
of six is also sufficient, resulting in a six-fold decrease in DSSS overhead.
Finally, because JIM-Beam has minimal assumptions on attacker power,
even if the overlying anti-jamming scheme is broken (for example, the spread-
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ing code in use by DSSS is leaked), JIM-Beam can still provide the same level
of performance as when it was used without any overlying anti-jamming
scheme. In other words, if DSSS provides 10 dB of gain, then the receiver
can reject up to 40 dB of jammer input; but even if DSSS provides no gain,
the receiver can still reject up to 30 dB of jammer input.
In summary, there are four major advantages in combining JIM-Beam with
other overlying anti-jamming schemes: First, it provides a lower-overhead
way to reject very strong jammers as compared to using either JIM-Beam
or the overlying anti-jamming scheme alone; second, it allows the system
to reject weak jammers that happen to be in the main lobe as long as the
anti-jamming scheme provides sufficient gain; third, it reduces the number of
jammers that the overlying anti-jamming scheme needs to reject; and finally,
it provides a fail-safe source of jammer rejection in case the overlying anti-
jamming scheme suffers a security failure.
5.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I propose using random directional antenna orientation to
mitigate the jamming attack. Previously proposed uncoordinated spread
spectrum schemes use randomization to conceal the code space on which a
transmitter operates, relying on the jammer’s limited computational ability
so that the jammer cannot discover that code and jam the message until
after the message has been successfully received. Instead, I propose the
JIM-Beam protocol that randomizes the orientation of the main lobe of a
directional antenna to conceal the direction in which a receiver is listening.
One particular benefit of using directional antennas to reject interference is
that jammers cannot perform the equivalent of wideband jamming, because
the location of each malicious node is a single-source of interference.
JIM-Beam is orthogonal to spread spectrum techniques, and when JIM-
Beam is used in conjunction with an overlying anti-jamming scheme, the
combined system has four major advantages:
1. It provides a lower-overhead way to reject very strong jammers as com-
pared to using either JIM-Beam or the overlying anti-jamming scheme
alone;
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2. It allows the system to reject weak jammers that happen to be in the
main lobe as long as the anti-jamming scheme provides sufficient gain;
3. It reduces the number of jammers that the overlying anti-jamming
scheme needs to reject; and
4. It provides a fail-safe source of jammer rejection in case the overlying
anti-jamming scheme suffers a security failure.
I use MATLAB simulation to evaluate the effectiveness of the JIM-Beam
protocol, and show that BRT-JIM-Beam can significantly outperform the
previously proposed UFH protocol in sparse networks. For networks that
are sensitive to energy consumption, BRT-JIM-Beam is also able to use less
power while providing jamming mitigation comparable to UFH.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I consider three philosophies in providing availability in
the lower layers of a network. Each philosophy has its own advantages in
comparison to others; and I present several case studies to illustrate these
philosophies.
A real-life network can use a combination of techniques derived from these
defense philosophies to achieve the desired reliability properties. For ex-
ample, a network can use fairness enforcement as a fail-safe addition to a
detection scheme; the network can also use randomization as a bootstrap
mechanism in face of powerful attackers. Designing and combining these
techniques provide a rich set of networking research topics and will surely
benefit tomorrow’s networks greatly.
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